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ABSTRACT

Research documents that insiders, who have access to private information, appear
to trade with profits before major corporate events like mergers, bankruptcy, dividend
announcements, and future cash flow news (see, e.g., Seyhun, 1990; Seyhun and Bradley,
1997; John and Lang, 1991; Jiang and Zaman, 2010). Another recent stream of studies
find that the size and quality of a firm’s patent portfolio are positively related to the
firm’s future stock returns (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach,
2011). However, there is little systematic evidence on whether insiders act
opportunistically when they possess private information about the firm’s patent portfolio.
In this dissertation, I empirically investigate insiders’ trading and option grants
throughout the different phases of an influential patent’s application. An influential patent
is defined as a patent with high citation impact. Chapter One focuses on insiders’ open
market transactions before the filing year of an influential patent, while Chapter Two
centers on informed executive stock option (ESO) exercises and unscheduled option
awards before two milestone dates of an influential patent: the application date and the
grant date.
In Chapter One, I examine the pattern of insider trading before the filing year of
an influential patent, for a sample of 2,470 firm-years from 1987 to 2006. In regressions
o f three insider trading measures controlling for factors related to insider trading, I find
that the level o f insiders’ net purchases is consistently and significantly higher in the year

before filing an influential patent than in the application year. The abnormal higher level
in net purchases is not from active insider trading - insiders increasing their purchases
above normal levels, but from passive insider trading - insiders reducing their sales
below normal levels in the year before filing an influential patent. In contrast, there is no
such insider trading pattern for the industry-size matched firms.

There is also no

abnormal insider trading before the filing of an inconsequential patent.
Chapter Two studies whether executives’ ESO exercises and options grants are
related to superior information about the quality of a firm’s patents, for a sample of 654
firm-events with an influential patent filed from 1996 to 2006. Using difference-indifferences (DID) regressions of two measures of option exercises, I find that executives
significantly delay exercising their stock options by reducing option exercises in the year
prior to the filing date of an influential patent and increasing option exercises in the year
after that. In contrast, no such pattern of informed option exercises is found in the
industry-size-performance matched control firms.
From the DID regression of the measure of option grants, I find no evidence of
abnormal option grants around the application date of an influential patent. However, I
find that executives receive more unscheduled stock options in the one-year period before
the grant date of an influential patent than after that. In contrast, the matched control
firms award fewer unscheduled stock options before a non-influential patent is granted
than after that. My findings show that in addition to exercising options opportunistically,
influencing the timing o f unscheduled option grants is another channel through which
insiders can pursue personal interests by exploiting the information advantages related to
the quality of a patent. Moreover, I provide evidence that insiders possess private

information throughout the lengthy application process, from the filing to the grant of
influential patent.
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CHAPTER ONE

INSIDER TRADING AROUND THE FILING OF
INFLUENTIAL PATENTS

Introduction
This study attempts to answer whether insiders can profit from their knowledge
on firms’ innovation outputs by empirically examining the insider trading before the
filing o f an influential patent measured by a high future citation count. A patent is one of
the most important measures of a firm’s innovation outputs (Griliches, 1990). In fact,
several recent studies find that the size and quality of a firm’s patent portfolio are
positively related to the firm’s future stock returns (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012;
Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011). Therefore, one might wonder whether insiders trade
opportunistically when they possess private information about the firm’s patents.
To answer the question, I investigate the insider trading before the filing of an
influential patent for two reasons. First, I focus on the insiders’ open market transactions
in the year before an influential patent being filed, as the insiders’ information advantages
over the public may have been greater in the year before a patent being filed. A firm’s
innovation activities are highly uncertain. The year before a patent being filed is the time
in which the future o f an innovation is fully revealed to the insiders, as the firm is
preparing the documents of the imminent patent application after an early stage of R&D
(Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005).

On average, it takes two years for a patent application to be granted (Hall, JafFe,
and Trajtenberg, 2001). Most firms prefer to keep the knowledge of innovation
confidential until the patent is granted since the public disclosure of the patent application
is not required (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Therefore, for several years starting from
the year before the filing of a patent, only insiders have intimate knowledge of the
pending patent application and of the potential economic impact of the patent. This
private information provides a tempting opportunity to corporate insiders for personal
gains by engaging in insider trading.
Secondly, I focus on influential patents since it is well known that the significance
or value o f each individual patent varies widely. A few patents with good quality are
extremely valuable, while many others are worth comparatively little (Pakes and
Schankerman, 1984) among a very large number of patents granted in U.S. - according to
the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), over 150,000 patents are granted every
year (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Information about a firm’s innovation is hard to
be evaluated by outsiders since doing so requires knowledge of the expertise and of
future changes in the development of a firm and/or its industry. Most outside investors
would have difficulty in estimating the economic implications of an innovation, even
when the patent is granted with detailed technical information available to the public.
Before the filing o f a patent, it would be almost impossible for outsiders to distinguish an
influential patent from a less significant or incremental technological discovery and then
correctly value the economic implications of a patent. Corporate insiders, who observe
the developing process of an innovation from the very beginning and possess large
amounts o f private information, may have a stronger notion of a patent’s ultimate

importance at the very beginning. Therefore, corporate insiders with private information
may engage in profitable trading opportunistically since they are better at identifying an
influential patent with higher future impact than outsiders before the patent is filed.
An influential patent is defined as a patent with high citation impact in this study.
Trajtenberg (1990) argues that the number of citations received by a patent is a better
measure o f innovation quality than the number of patents a firm owns. When granted, a
patent is required to cite all previous patents upon which this new technology builds.
Accordingly, an influential patent can represent a platform on which future innovations
will be based and is expected to receive more citations in the future. Several studies have
shown that a patent’s citations contain valuation-relevant information and may be used as
an accurate measure of the value of a patent (see, e.g. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005;
Gu, 2005; Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008; McGahee, 2011; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011).
Following these studies, I measure the impact of a patent using the total adjusted citations
received by the patent. Specifically, I define an influential patent as one that is ranked in
the top ten-percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology sub
category based on three-digit patent classes from the USPTO classification.
Using patent data compiled from patents filings to the USPTO by the National
Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER), I analyze insiders’ open market transactions
during the calendar year before (‘informed’ period) and the calendar year (control period)
that a patent is filed for a sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples.
There are 2,470 firm-years, in which 3,538 influential patents were filed during the
period 1987-2006. The two control samples are an industry-size matched sample in

which no influential patent was filed and a sample of “inconsequential patent” firms in
which patents were ranked in the bottom ten-percent cited patents of the application year.
Before analyzing insider trading, I present two pieces of evidence that an
influential patent is positively associated with the filing firm’s future stock performances.
First, I find that the market reacts more favorably when an influential patent is granted by
USPTO than when an inconsequential patent is granted. The cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) of the filing firm when an influential patent is granted are largely positive and
significantly higher than those of the filing firm when an inconsequential patent is
granted. For example, the average CARs over days (-5, 5) around a patent grant date is
0.95% (significant) for an influential patent, and significantly higher than that for an
inconsequential patent at -0.05% (insignificant). Secondly, I find that the sample firms
with influential patents have better stock performances in three years after filing patents
applications than firms in two control samples, as the post-application long-run abnormal
returns (adjusted by the Fama-French three-factor model) for the sample firms of
influential patents are significantly higher.
I next examine the open-market stock transactions of three groups of corporate
insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders except for large blockholders.
Following Agrawal and Nasser (2012), I investigate purchases, sales, and net purchases
of insiders, using three measures of the level of insider trading.
In regressions of three insider trading measures controlling for factors related to
insider trading, I find that the level of insiders’ net purchases is consistently and
significantly higher in the year before filing an influential patent than the application
year. The abnormal higher level in net purchases is not from active insider trading,

insiders increasing their purchases above normal levels, but from passive insider trading,
insiders reducing their sales below normal levels in the year before filing an influential
patent. In contrast, there is no such insider trading pattern in the industry-size matched
sample and no abnormal insider trading before the filing of an inconsequential patent.
This pattern holds for each insider group. This pattern of passive trading by insiders the
year before the filing o f an influential patent is similar to the passive trading by target
firms’ insiders before takeover announcements as documented by Agrawal and Nasser
(2012).

By examining the insider trading before the filing of an influential patent
measured by high future citation impact, I add to the extensive research that has focused
on insider trading activities prior to major corporate events like mergers, stock
repurchases,

seasoned

equity

offerings,

earnings

announcements,

dividend

announcements, and bankruptcy filings (see, e.g., Agrawal and Nasser, 2012; Raad and
Wu, 1995; Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Sivakumar and Waymire, 1994; John and Lang, 1991;
Seyhun and Bradley, 1997, respectively). Those studies provide evidences that insiders
appear to trade profitably because of their access to private information that is not
available to outside shareholders until the major events are publicly announced.
Despite the importance of patents that measure firms’ innovation outputs to firms’
future performance, there is little systematic evidence on whether insiders trade
opportunistically when they possess private information on the firms’ patent portfolio.
Few studies find evidences that insiders gain by trading on their private information
related to research and development (R&D), a measure of innovation input (Aboody and
Lev, 2000; Coff and Lee, 2003 ). In a closely related paper, Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005)

examine insider trading related to patents and find that managers purchase stock well
before breakthrough patents are filed. My study differs from Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005)
and adds to the literature in three aspects. In the first place, this paper provides evidence
based on larger and more comprehensive sample, twenty years of patent data from 19872006, as opposed to three years of patents from 1988-1990 in Ahuja, Coff, and Lee
(2005). In the second place, I define an influential patent by the citation rank in its own
technology sub-category, based on the USPTO classification to account for the varying
citation patterns o f patents from different technology classes. Lastly, Ahuja, Coff, and
Lee (2005) only examine values of stock purchases by insiders and find evidence of
active insider trading; we, however, use three measures of insider trading and investigate
purchases, sales, and net purchases to provide systematic evidences of a pattern of
passive trading by insiders during the year before the filing of an influential patent.

Prior Studies on Insider Trading, Innovation,
Patents, and Information Asymmetry
Do Insiders Gain Through Insider Trading?
Corporate insiders are defined by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)
as “officers, directors, or owners of more than ten percent of total common stock
outstanding”. Though most insiders’ trading is routine, legal, and conducted for liquidity
reasons, previous studies show that insiders have predictive ability to earn abnormal
returns from trading in the securities of their firms (Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff
and Zaman, 1988). Managers seem to have an informational advantage on major
corporate events several months ahead of a public announcement. Extensive studies
indicate that insiders appear to trade with profits before bankruptcy (Seyhun and Bradley,

1997), dividend announcements (John and Lang, 1991), stock repurchases (Lee,
Mikkelson and Partch, 1992; Raad and Wu, 1995), seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff
and Lee, 1991; Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle, 2001), merger and takeover (Seyhun, 1990;
Agrawal and Nasser, 2012), future cash flow news (Jiang and Zaman, 2010), accounting
restatements (Agrawal and Cooper, 2008), and delayed goodwill impairments (Muller,
Neamtiu, and Riedl, 2012).
The gains of insider trading stem from information asymmetries between
investors and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), in which managers have access to
nonpublic information o f important strategic events. Generally, investors may view
insider purchases as a signal of good news and insider sales as a signal of bad news.
Previous studies find that private information can be implied from stock purchases, but
not from stock sales (see, e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng, Metrick,
and Zeckhauser, 2003). Agrawal and Nasser (2012) find that target firms’ insiders not
only decrease their purchases before takeover announcements but that the insiders also
reduce their sales even more, thus increasing their net purchases. Agrawal and Nasser
(2012) define this pattern as “passive trading”. Their findings suggest that insider sales
further imply important corporate information, and they argue regulations for insider
trading are not effective in regulating the insider gains from sales, not as easily
recognized as insider gains from purchases.

Innovation as a Source o f Information Asymmetry
It is commonly recognized that technological innovation brings long-run
economic benefits for firms (Griliches, 1984, 2000). However, information asymmetries
are more severe in innovation-intensive firms. For example, Ciftci, Lev, and

Radhakrishnan (2011) find evidence that R&D-intensive firms which engage in basic
research activities are likely to suffer from higher information asymmetry than firms that
mimic and extend existing technologies. Generally, such innovation-intensive firms have
a relatively large amount of intangible assets, utilize more resources for technology and
innovation, and are more likely to have a fast changing technical environment. All these
features make it hard for market participants to accurately value and estimate the firm’s
future prospects. Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) suggest that investor dependence
on analysts’ information is greater in R&D-intensive firms, while Gu (2005) and Ciftici
(2012) find that market participants, including investors and analysts, do not fully value
the implication of enhanced innovation capabilities and underestimate future earnings of
R&D-intensive firms. Moreover, in innovation-intensive companies, normally the CEOs
or top managers are engineers or experts in their field, which increases the difficulty for
shareholders to monitor them since doing so requires the relevant technology knowledge.
The less effective and less efficient monitoring mechanism for innovation-intensive
firms, accordingly, provides the managers more opportunities to pursue their own
interests. Insider trading could be a moderate channel for them through which to gain
abnormal returns at the cost of outside investors.
Innovation, as an important source of information asymmetries and incentive of
inside trading, has not been comprehensively investigated. Aboody and Lev (2000) point
out that one potential source of insider gains through insider trading is research and
development (R&D). They find that insider gains from insider trading in R&D-intensive
firms are substantially larger than those in firms without R&D. Thus, R&D can be
viewed as a major contributor to information asymmetry. Coff and Lee (2003) further

suggest that insider purchases have greater signaling value to investors in R&D firms and
find evidence that insider purchases generate larger positive stock price reactions for
R&D-intensive firms.
Patents, one of the most important indicators of innovative output, have been
commonly used in the literature as a measure of firms’ technological progress. Gu
(2005), Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011), and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) show that
firms with high-quality patents have better future operating/stock performances. Pandit,
Wasley, and Zach (2011) measure a patent’s quality by the patent’s citations. Eisdorfer
and Hsu (2011) report that technologically innovative firms are less likely to go bankrupt.
Additionally, Hsu, Lee, Liu, and Zhang (2011) find that non-insider bondholders use the
output of innovation, granted patents and associated citations, to evaluate the economic
value o f these innovations and to price the bonds of patent-owning firms accordingly.
Therefore, patents seem to contain useful information in assessing the productivity of
firms’ innovation and understanding the relation between innovation and financial
performances.
However, patents have received much less attention in existing research as a
source of information asymmetry and an incentive of insider trading. Using three years of
patent data (1988-1990), Ahuja, Coff, and Lee (2005) posit that managers may use
foresight on firms’ strategic assets to pursue private interests by engaging in insider
trading and find that managers purchase stocks well before breakthrough patents are
filed. Rong (2012) finds that effects of a firm’s insider trading patterns are significant in
explaining the unexpected fluctuations in patent output with control for the effect of

R&D expenditures. That finding supports the argument that management has private
information about a firm’s R&D productivity beyond what is known to outside investors.

Sample Selection and Data Description
Sample o f “Influential Patent ” Firms
Several databases are used to construct the sample, including the National Bureau
o f Economic Research (NBER) patent data, Thomson Financial Insiders Filings database
(TFI), Compustat, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Patent-related
data are from the updated NBER patent database originally developed by Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001) and revised as of August, 2010. The database includes detailed
information on all patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
during the period 1976 - 2006. Patent citations, the key indicator o f patent value, suffer
from a truncation bias since citations are generally received for years after the patent is
granted. The patents that were granted in early years would have more time to receive
citations than those granted in more recent years. Thus, each patent’s citation is adjusted
by multiplying with the truncation weight index, which is from Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2001) and also found in the NBER patent dataset. I use the application year
as the relevant event time for the study of insider trading since a patent generally is
applied for as soon as a firm has completed the innovation, while the grant date depends
upon the review process at the Patent Office.
An initial patent data is constructed using all patents filed by firms during the
period 1987-2006, 1except those missing a unique assignee number, or missing a citation
truncation weight as of 2006, or with the status ‘M’ (missing) or ‘W’ (withdrawn).
1 My sample begins with patents applied for in 1987 because insider trading data in TFI Insider database
starts from 1986 and I need one year o f insider trading data before the application o f a patent.

Specifically, I define influential patents as patents that are ranked in the top ten-percent
most cited o f the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category in the NBER
database. The influential firm-year is the year when a firm applies for an influential
patent. To avoid overlap, if a firm filed influential patents for multiple years, I only
examine those years separated by at least a two-year gap in the tests. A firm may apply
for multiple influential patents in a single year.
Panel A o f Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedures starting from the
NBER patent data. During the period 1987-2006, there are total 11,955 firm-years, in
which at least one patent filed is ranked in the top ten-percent most cited of the year in its
technology sub-category in the NBER database, corresponding to 2,721 distinct firms. I
drop 7,674 firm-years (168 firms) in which at least one influential patent was filed in
each o f any two consecutive years, and I drop 21 firm-years (four firms) in which all
influential patents received zero adjusted citation before the end of year 2006.
This method results in 4,260 firm-years (2,549 firms) in which influential patents
were filed. I then eliminate 1,478 firm-years (854 firms) which are not listed on CRSP
and 23 firm-years (ten firms) with unavailable size data (shares outstanding times the
share price) in the applying-year on CRSP. All the remaining firm-years (854 firms) are
matched with Compustat database. Finally, I omit 289 firm-years are not listed in the TFI
insider filing dataset. The final sample (“influential patent” firms) consists of 2,470 firmyears with influential patents filed from 1,498 distinct firms.
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Panel A: Sample selection
Dropped
firmyears

Criterion
Total number o f observations with at least one
influential patent filed
Less the observations for which influential patents
were filed in any o f two consecutive years
Less the observation for which influential patents
received zero total adjusted citations
Number of observations in which influential patent was
filed
Less observations for which their firms are not listed
on CRSP

a of

Uof
Firmyears

Dropped
firms

2721

11955
7674

168

21

4
2549

4260
854

1478
2782

Less observations with unavailable shares
outstanding or the share price data for the applyingyear on CRSP

1695

10

23
2759

Less observations for which their firms are not
covered in TFI
Final Sample

1

Chemical

2
3
4
5
6

1685

289

187
1498

2470

Panel B: Summary statistics o f influential patents
Category Name
Uof
Cat.
influential
Code
patents

Percentage
Count

Distinct
Firms

Average
Cites

Average
Cites
Adjusted for
Truncations

484

13.7%

23.26

40.88

Computers & Communications

811

22.9%

42.21

85.27

Drugs & Medical

523

14.8%

34.88

59.45

Electrical & Electronic

630

17.8%

29.17

55.10

Mechanical

493

13.9%

24.81

43.47

Others

597

16.9%

25.14

43.34

Total

3538

100.0%

30.91

57.11

Panel A shows the sample selection out o f the 11,955 firm-years (2,721 distinct firms) in which at least one
patent filed is ranked in the top ten-percent most cited of the application year in its three-digit technology
class (influential patents) in the NBER database during 1987-2006. Panel B provides the technology class
distribution, average cites, and average adjusted cites for the sample o f 3,538 influential patents
(corresponding to 2,470 filing firm-years). The influential firm-year is the year when a firm applies for an
influential patent. To avoid overlap, if a firm files influential patents for multiple years, 1 only include those
years separated by at least two years. The adjusted citation is computed as the citation times the truncation
weight index from the NBER patent dataset.
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Panel B of Table 1 provides the distribution of technology classes for the sample
o f influential patents. My main sample includes 2,470 filing firm-years, in which total
3,538 influential patents were filed. These influential patents cover 333 patent classes
among the more than 400 main (three-digit) patent classes defined by the USPTO.
According to the higher-level classification developed in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg
(2001), I aggregate all the classes into six main categories: Chemical (excluding Drugs);
Computers and Communications; Drugs and Medical; Electrical and Electronics;
Mechanical; and Others. Average citations and adjusted citations (the citation times the
truncation weight index) are also provided in Panel B. Influential patents within the
Computers and Communications category account for the most in the sample (22.9%).
They additionally have the highest average citation count at 42.21 and adjusted citation
count at 85.27. The next categories are Electrical and Electronics and Others, accounting
for 17.8% and 16.9% respectively. The remaining influential patents distribute evenly
among the other three categories from 13.7% to 14.8%.

Two Cross-Sectional Control Samples
Two control samples are constructed: an industry-size matched sample of “noinfluential patent” firms and an unmatched sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. All
control firms are required to have data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI. For the sample
of “no-influential patent” firms, I first exclude any firm with an influential patent filed
from 1987 to 2006. Each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms is then
matched to a control firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the application
year from the same two-digit primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. I
perform the match without replacement. A “no-influential patent” matched firm might or

might not apply for a patent in the matched year. The industry-size matched “noinfluential patent” firms consist of 2,470 firm-years, corresponding to 1,386 distinct
firms.
The sample of “inconsequential patent” firms consists of all firm-years in which
at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten-percent most cited of the application
year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification, and
the firm did not have any influential patent during the period 1987-2006. The sample of
“inconsequential patent” firms consists of 1,699 firm-years, corresponding to 346 distinct
firms. Because of the relatively small number of “inconsequential patent” firms (346)
compared to the number of “influential patent” firms (1,498), the sample of
“inconsequential patent” firms is not matched to “influential patent” firms by industry
and year.
Table 2 reports mean and median values of financial and operating characteristics
for the main sample and two control samples. Using p-values of two-tailed t-tests and
two-tailed Wilcoxon tests, Table 2 also reports differences in means and in medians
between “influential patent” firms and each of the two control samples. Firm value, sales,
total assets, and financial leverage ratios are for the fiscal year prior to the application
year. Firms’ sizes are similar in the two samples, with a mean market capitalization (total
assets) o f $1,454 million ($1,852 million) for “influential patent” firms and $1,258
million ($1,956 million) for “no-influential patent” firms.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
M ea n

Firm size
Market value o f equity ($
m ill.)
Sales ($ m ill.)
Total assets ($ m ill.)
Firm value ($ m ill.)
Stock volatility and nrior
returns
a (% )
PRET(-1) (%)
Growth
B/M
Firm value/Total assets
Sales growth rate (%)
Operating Derformance (%)
O P A (-l)
O PA (-2)
O PA (-3)
OPA
Financial leverage
Long-term debt/total assets
Long-term debt/firm value

M e d ia n

(1)
“Influential
patent”
firms

(2)
’’N o influential
patent”
firms

(3)
“Inconsequ
ential
patent”
firms

p-value
( l) - ( 2 )

(1)
“Influential
patent”
firms

(2 )
"N oinfluential
patent”
firms

(3)
“Inconseque
ntial patent”
firms

p-value
d )-(2 )

p-value
d )-(3 )

1454
1127
1852
2921

1258
1082
1956
2860

17129
11719
16239
29061

0.2 6 0
0.711
0.8 1 6
0.913

229
149
147
323

200
146
142
286

4439
4836
5053
8489

0.022
0.742
0.5 1 9
0.092

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

3.75
22.52

3.69
26.31

2 .36
19.15

0.385
0.1 7 6

0.000
0.164

3.39
6.74

3 .2 6
9 .52

1.97
14.07

0.0 8 0
0.0 4 7

0.000
0.000

0.62
2.97
19.33

0.58
2.51
16.79

2 .09
2.01
7.93

0.3 3 0
0 .0 1 4
0.0 6 4

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.43
1.69
10.19

0.45
1.58
10.29

0 .3 9
1.57
6.04

0.2 1 6
0.001
0.8 3 7

0.000
0.000
0.000

-1.22
-1.07
-0.86
0.85

3.48
2.36
3.58
4.20

9 .49
9.68
9 .60
9.95

0.000

8.12
8.20
8.50
8.05

8 .9 0
8.92
9.03
8.54

10.30
10.30
10.41
10.15

0.013
0.031
0.033
0.0 8 9

0.000

0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.14
0.10

0.18
0.12

0.17
0.12

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000

0.08
0.04

0.12
0.0 7

0.1 6
0 .0 9

0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000

0 .0 1 6
0.001

p-value
(l)-(3 )

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000

0 .0 0 2

0.000
0.000

This table provides summary statistics o f firm characteristics for the sample o f “influential patent” firms and two control samples. The sample o f “influential
patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and the “inconsequential
patent” firms. We define influential patents as those top ten-percent most cited patents of the application year in its 3-digit technology sub-category based on the
USPTO classification. The influential firm-year is the year when a firm applies for an influential patent. Both control samples are required to have corresponding
data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the sample period.

Table 2 (Continued)
To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with
the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms
consists of firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the
NBER database. All firms of the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each o f the samples o f “influential patent” firms and “noinfluential patent” firms consists o f 2,470 firm-years, while the sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists of 1,699 firm-years. Market value o f equity is
measured at the end of calendar year prior to the application year. Firm value equals (book value of total assets - book value o f equity + market value o f equity).
Firm value, sales, total assets, and financial leverage ratios are for fiscal year prior to the application year. Stock return volatility (o) is the standard deviation o f
stock returns for the year prior to application year. PRET(-l) (prior stock returns) is computed as the buy-and-hold returns over one year prior to the application
year. B/M is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value o f equity as of the end of fiscal year before the year applying influential patent. Sales
growth is defined as [sales(-l)/sales(-5)]1/4-l. OPA(t) is the operating performance to total assets for year t relative to the application year (t=0). Operation
performance is operating income before depreciation. OPA is the mean o f OPA(t), equal to (OPA(-l)+OPA(-2)+OPA(-3))/3. Other than been stated, all other
financial data are from Compustat. The differences in means between two samples are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians
are tested by Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test. P-values are reported.
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The mean daily stock volatility for “influential patent” firms is 3.75%, similar to
the one for “no-influential patent” firms, 3.69%. The prior stock returns are close at
22.52% and 26.31%. One of three growth measures, the B/M ratio, indicates that two
groups have similar growth opportunities. None of these differences between firms with
influential or non-influential patents is statistically significant. Other measures between
the two samples are significantly different, including the operating performance
(measured by operating income before depreciation to total assets), financial leverages,
and the other two growth measures (firm value/total assets and sales growth rate).
Firms with inconsequential patents are significantly different from firms with
influential patents. On average, firms with inconsequential patents are larger in size, have
a lower stock volatility, a lower growth opportunity, and a better prior operating
performance.

Time-Series Control
For each observation in the sample of “influential patent” firms and two control
samples, I analyze insiders’ open market trading during the informed and control periods.
The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed (the pre-application
year). The control period is the calendar year when a firm applies for a patent (the
application year). I examine insider trading before the application year of a patent
because, as discussed above, insiders clearly have information and foresight on
innovation at the first stage of the preparation for the patent application, and their trading
at that period is less likely to be noticed by regulators and investors. I do not examine
insider trading after the application year of the patent because the news of applying for a’
patent might leak out in some way, and outsiders might pay more attention to insiders
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patent might leak out in some way, and outsiders might pay more attention to insiders
actions, which reduces insiders’ incentive to trade on the basis of knowledge of
innovation.

Stock-Price Reaction when an Influential/
Inconsequential Patent Is Granted
To verify the positive association between influential patents and the filing firm’s
future stock performances, I first investigate the stock-price reaction when an influential
patent is granted. For comparison, I also present corresponding reactions when an
inconsequential patent is granted. I do not examine such stock-price reaction for the
matched “no-influential patent” firms, because these firms are not required to have
patents filed in the year they are matched with “influential patent” firms.
The abnormal return of stock i on day t is computed as:
e„=r„ - r ml,

(1)

where r* and rm are the stock returns for firm i and the market, respectively. The market
return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index. I then calculate the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for firm i over days (tj, t2) as:

CAK * =

•

( 2 )

>=>i

Table 3 reports the mean and median values of CARs for the samples of
“influential patent” and “inconsequential patent” firms over three windows covering the
trading days (-1, +1), (-5, +5) and (-20, +5) around the announcement date of a patent
being granted (day 0).
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Table 3
Stock-Price Reaction when an Influential/Inconsequential Patent Is Granted
Days around announcement
Category
(1) Influential patents
granted
(p-value)
(2) Inconsequential
patents granted
(p-value)
(1) vs. (2) difference
(p-value)

(-1.+1)

Mean
(-5,+5)

(-20, +5)

0.27**

0 95***

(0.0213)

N
3,478

36,005

(-1.+1)

Median
(-5, +5)

(-20, +5)

1.50***

-0.11

0.05*

0.27**

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

(0.9347)

(0.0745)

(0.0117)

0.04**

-0.05

-0.05

-0.05

-0.20***

-0.14**

(0.0159)
0.23***
(0.0007)

(0.1634)
1.00***
(0.0000)

(0.3029)
1.55***
(0.0000)

(0.6940)
-0.06
(0.3844)

(0.0003)
0.25
(0.1263)

(0.0392)
0.41**
(0.0464)

This table reports the mean/median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and average CARs differences for
three windows around a patent’s granting date (day 0) for the samples of “influential patent” firms and
“inconsequential patent” firms. The sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential
patents filed during 1987-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten-percent most cited patents
o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. The sample o f
“inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent applied for is ranked in
the bottom ten-percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER
database. “Inconsequential patent” firms are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and
TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each patent granted, the abnormal
return for trading day t is calculated as the daily return on the stock minus the value-weighted CRSP index
on day t. Both returns include dividends. There are 3,478 (36,005) influential patents (inconsequential
patents) with available return data on CRSP around the grant date, corresponding to 1,475 (342) applying
firms in 2,432 (1,692) firm-years. Mean/median and differences values are reported as percentages. The
differences in means are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians are tested
by Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively

The observation size for Table 3 is 3,468 for the sample of “influential patent”
firms, indicating 3,468 patents were granted with available firms’ return data on CRSP
for the 2,470 firm-years in which at least one influential patent was filed. For
“inconsequential patent” firms, the sample size is more than ten

times larger, with

36,004 patents granted for 1,699 firm-years. The difference in the sample sizes is
consistent with the notion that a few patents with good quality are extremely valuable,
while many others are worth comparatively little. Therefore, it is justified to separate
influential patents from other patents in my study.
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Over the trading window of three days (-1, +1), both groups experience
significantly positive mean CARs of about 0.27% and 0.04%, respectively. However,
over the longer trading windows of days (-5, +5) and (-20, +5), firms with influential
patents granted experience positively larger mean CARs of about 0.95% and 1.5%, which
are statistically significant at the one percent level, while firms with inconsequential
patents granted experience a negative mean CARs at 0.05%, though not statistically
significant. The median values of CARs have similar patterns, except that CARs in the
three trading days are negative and non-significant for both groups, and the negative
median CARs o f “inconsequential patent” firms over the two longer trading windows are
significant at five percent and one percent level. All three mean values of CARs are
significantly higher for firms with influential patents than for firms with inconsequential
patents at one percent level. The results show that stock price reacts positively to the
news that an influential patent is granted and negatively when an inconsequential patent
is granted, indicating that the market has the ability to distinguish influential patents from
inconsequential patents when a patent is granted. The fact that the market reacts to the
news of an influential patent being granted also suggests that non-public information does
exist for a long period in firms with influential innovation.

Long-Run Stock Performance
I next compare the long-run stock performances between the sample of
“influential patent” firms and two control samples. I use the standard Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model to estimate the long-run abnormal returns for firms in each
sample:
R ,- R F l = a + fM K TRF, + f 2HMLt + fcSMB, + e, ,

(3)

where R, is the monthly stock return for a firm, RF, is the monthly risk-free rate, Rr RF,
is the excess return, MKTRF, is the excess return on the market, measured as the valueweighted market return minus the risk-free rate, HMLt (High Minus Low) is the average
return on the two highest value (high book-to-market) portfolios minus the average return
on the two highest growth (low book-to-market) portfolios, and SMB, (Small Minus Big)
is the average return on the three smallest capitalization portfolios minus the average
return on the three biggest capitalization portfolios. The alpha (a) coefficient represents
the difference between the monthly return predicted by the three factors and the actual
monthly return, so alpha is viewed as the long-run abnormal return.
Table 4 reports the average long-run abnormal returns and the average return
difference between the sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples in
two years following the application year. For the application year (year 0), the abnormal
returns of “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms are not significantly
different at 0.83% and 0.87%, respectively. However, when investors hold the stock for a
longer time, “influential patent” firms outperform both control samples.
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Table 4
Long-Run Stock Performance
N

Year

0
(0,+l)
(0, + 2)

Mean long-run abnormal returns (%)

(1)& (2)
(3)
“Influential
“Inconse
patent” firms
quential
& ’’N o patent”
influential
firms
patent” firms
2470
2470
2470

1699
1699
1699

(1)
“Influential
patent” firms

0.83**
1.04***
0.94***

(3)
(2)
”N o -“ Inconse
influential quential
patent” patent”
firms
firms
0.87**
0.53***
0.50***

0.28***
0.20***
0.22***

Returns Difference (%)

(l)-(2)

t-stat

-0.05
-0.1
0.51 4.31***
0.43 4.51***

^

(3)

0.55

t Stat

1.34

0 .8 4 6 .9 6 * * *
0.72 7.21***

This table reports the mean long-run abnormal returns and the average return difference between the
sample o f “influential patent” firms and two control samples in two years after the application year (year
0). The sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 19872006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms. The
standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to estimate the long-run abnormal returns for
firms in each sample based on their monthly returns data on CRSP. Influential patents are identified as
those top ten-percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on
USPTO classification. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in
the sample of “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest market
capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample
o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the
bottom ten-percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER database.
Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TF1, and did not
apply for any influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the
NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each o f the samples o f “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms
consists o f 2,470 firm-years, while the sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists of 1,699 firmyears. Mean values and returns differences are reported as percentages. The returns differences in Column
((l)-(2)) are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests, and those in Column ((1) vs. (3)) are by two
independent samples t-tests. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten
percent levels, respectively.

In years (0, +1) and (0, +2), the mean abnormal returns for “influential patent”
firms are, respectively, 1.04% and 0.94%, while for “no-influential patent” firms, they are
only 0.53% and 0.50%. The differences of abnormal returns between “influential patent”
and “no-influential patent” firms Eire significantly positive at 0.51% and 0.43%. The
differences o f abnormal returns between “influential patent” and “inconsequential patent”
firms have a similar pattern, except that the mean abnormal return of “inconsequential
patent” firms is much smaller and return differences are accordingly larger. I also
calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns as another measure of long-run performance and
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find similar results. For brevity, results of buy-and-hold abnormal returns are not
reported.
It is not surprising that firms with influential patents have better long-run
performances than others due to the long-term effect of technological innovation on
firms’ future development. This evidence together with the stock-price reaction evidence
supports my definition o f influential patents in that those technologies are influential and
may signal future economic performance of firms.

Insider Trading Data
Insider trading data is obtained from Thomson Financial Insiders Filings Data
Files (TFI, September 2007). This data contains all insider activities as reported on Form
Three, Four, and Five filed with the SEC.2 Focusing on the Table One in TFI database, I
only consider two types of insider transactions, ‘open market or private purchase o f non
derivative or derivative security’ and ‘open market or private sale of non-derivative
security’, for each “influential patent” and control firm during the pre-application and
application years. I drop filings marked as inaccurate or incomplete by TFI (Cleanse
Indicators as ‘S’ or ‘A ’), filings labeled as an amendment to an earlier filing (Amendment
Indicator as ‘A’), or transactions that involve shares indirectly owned by insiders via a
partnership, corporation, trust or other entity (Ownership Type as ‘I’). The open-market
stock transactions of three groups of corporate insiders are examined: all insiders, top
management, and all insiders except for large blockholders. The top management group
consists of Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO),
2 Most insider transactions are reported on Form Four. Form Three is the initial statement o f beneficial
ownership that insiders must file. Form Five is an annual statement of change in beneficial ownership and
contains activity from small or exempt transactions that are not reported on Form Four.

24
and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners of more than ten percent of
any class of equity securities of a firm.
Following prior studies, I use three measures to examine the level of insider
trading: number of shares traded by insiders (#shares), dollar value of shares traded by
insiders ($shares), and percentage of outstanding equity traded by insiders (%equity). The
dollar value of shares traded is the number of shares traded multiplied by the transaction
price reported on the TFI insider filing data. The percentage of outstanding equity traded
equals the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding at the
end of calendar year. In the following tests, for observations without any insider purchase
or sales over the informed or control periods, I assign zero to the measures of insider
purchases or sales.

Results
Univariate Results
Univariate results are presented for insider purchases, sales, and net purchases
(purchases - sales) in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7, respectively.
Insider Purchases
Table 5 provides mean values of three measures of insider purchases for the
sample o f “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and
control periods. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent was filed. The
control period is the calendar year when a firm applied for a patent. Panels A to C present
the results for each of three groups of insiders: 1) all insiders, 2) top management, 3) all
insiders except for large blockholders.

Table 5
Univariate Test: Insider Purchases
Panel A: All insiders
“Influential
Statistic
patent” firms
(1)
Pre(2)
Insider buy
apply
Apply
measures
year
year
mean
#shares
0.060
0.046
1.174
Sshares
0.601
%equity
0.004
0.003

Panel B: Top management
“Influential patent”
Statistic
firms
(1)
Insider
Pre(2)
apply
Apply
buy
measures
year
year
mean
#shares
0.006
0.008
Sshares
0.053
0.083
%equity
0.000
0.001

”No-influential
patent” firms
(3)
Pre(4)
apply
Apply
year
year
0.061
0.714
0.003

0.078
0.889
0.004

”No-influential
patent” firms
(3)
Pre(4)
apply
Apply
year
year
0.006
0.061

0.000

0.010
0.134
0.001

Panel C: All insiders but blockholders
“Influential patent” ”No-influential
Statistic
firms
patent” firms
(3)
(1)
Insider
PrePre(4)
(2)
buy
apply
Apply
Apply
apply
year
year
measures
year
year

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
Apply
apply
year
year
0.023
0.661
0.001

0.023
0.661
0.001

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
Apply
apply
year
year
0.002
0.069

0.002
0.044

0.000

0.000

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
Apply
apply
year
year

p-values

(D-(2)
0.366
0.133
0.677

(1M3)
0.952
0.258
0.555

(D-(5)
0.033
0.267
0.013

(3)-(4)
0.416
0.459
0.224

(5)-(6)
0.956

1.000
0.669

(1-2)(3-4)
0.235
0.097
0.278

(1-2)(5-6)
0.458
0.237
0.677

p-values

(D-(2)
0.090
0.077
0.101

(1H 3)
0.849
0.575
0.834

(1K 5)
0.008
0.527

0.000

(3)-(4)
0.131
0.231
0.086

(5)-(6)
0.966
0.357
0.098

d -2 )(3-4)
0.622
0.504
0.902

(1-2)(5-6)
0.174
0.070
0.402

p-values

(l)-(2)

(D-(3)

(1>(5)

(3)-(4)

(5)-(6)

(1-2)(3-4)

(1-2)(5-6)

Table 5 (Continued)
mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity

0.060
1.173
0.004

0.046
0.600
0.003

0.061
0.714
0.003

0.078
0.889
0.004

0.023
0.661
0.001

0.023
0.661
0.001

0.365
0.134
0.676

0.953
0.259
0.554

0.033
0.268
0.013

0.415
0.457
0.223

0.956
0.999
0.670

0.234
0.097
0.277

0.457
0.237
0.676

This table reports the mean values o f three measures o f insider purchases for “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and control
periods. “Influential patent” firms consist o f firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and
“inconsequential patent” firms. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed. The control period is the calendar year a firm applies for a
patent. Separated by at least a two-year gap, influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its technology
sub-category based on the USPTO classification. To construct the matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential
patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same
year. The sample of “inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent least cited o f the
application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and
TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panels A
to C show the results for each o f three groups o f corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders but blockholders. The top management group
consists of Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners o f more than
ten percent of any class o f equity securities o f a firm. For each firm-year, I report insider purchase activity during the pre-application and application years. The
three measures o f insider purchases are #shares (number o f shares bought by insiders in millions during a year), Sshares (dollar value o f shares bought by insiders
in millions during a year), and %equity (number o f shares bought by insiders during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). All insiders trading data is
from Thomson Insiders Filings database. The differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests except that we use independent samples t-test to
compare means for the sample o f “influential patent” firms and the sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms. The p-values o f differences are reported in the
table.

Table 6
Univariate Test: Insider Sales
Panel A: All insiders
“Influential patent”
Statistic
firms
(1)
Insider
Pre(2)
sales
apply
Apply
measuresi
year
year
mean
0.292
#shares
0.188
Sshares
6.093
8.935
%equity
0.008
0.011

Panel B: Top management
“Influential patent”
Statistic
firms
Preapply
year

0.288
7.494
0.010

0.433
11.342
0.015

”No-influential
patent” firms

(3)

(1)
Insider
sales
measures

”No-influential
patent” firms
(3)
Pre(4)
apply
Apply
year
year

(2)
Apply
year

Preapply
year

(4)
Apply
year

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
apply
Apply
year
year
0.239
13.746
0.002

0.278
15.436
0.004

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
apply
Apply
year
year

p-values

d)-(2)
0.001
0.003
0.001

(D-(3)
0.024
0.242
0.036

(0 -(5 )
0.063
0.000
0.000

(3)-(4)
0.087
0.123
0.009

(5)-(6)
0.198
0.450
0.006

(1-2)(3-4)
0.648
0.702
0.422

(1-2)(5-6)
0.153
0.597
0.196

p-values

(l)-(2)

0H 3)

(l)-(5)

(3)-(4)

(5)-(6)

(1-2)(3-4)

(1-2)(5-6)

mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity

0.043
1.709
0.002

0.058
2.076
0.002

0.041
1.286
0.002

0.059
1.549
0.003

Panel C: All insiders but blockholders
“Influential patent”
”No-influential
Statistic
firms
patent” firms
(3)
(1)
Insider
PrePre(2)
(4)
sales
Apply
apply
apply
Apply
year
year
measures
year
year

0.050
2.585
0.001

0.056
2.885
0.001

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
apply
Apply
year
year

0.073
0.294
0.014

0.708
0.153
0.828

0.357
0.025
0.000

0.007
0.214
0.000

0.287
0.315
0.541

0.749
0.789
0.035

0.411
0.892
0.094

p-values

0X 2)

(l)-(3)

O H 5)

(3)-(4)

(5)-(6)

(1-2)(3-4)

(1-2)(5-6)

Table 6 (Continued)
mean
#shares
Sshares
%equity

0.187
6.055
0.008

0.292
8.931
0.011

0.288
7.489
0.010

0.433
11.324
0.015

0.239
13.740
0.002

0.278
15.430
0.004

0.001
0.002
0.001

0.023
0.230
0.035

0.060
0.000
0.000

0.089
0.124
0.010

0.197
0.450
0.005

0.658
0.716
0.439

0.149
0.585
0.201

This table reports the mean values of three measures o f insider sales for “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and control
periods. “Influential patent” firms consist of firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent” firms and
“inconsequential patent” firms. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed. The control period is the calendar year a firm applies for a
patent. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO
classification. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control
firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential
patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub
category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any
influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panels A to C show the results for each
o f three groups o f corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders but blockholders. The top management group consists o f Chairman, Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners o f more than ten percent o f any class o f
equity securities o f a firm. For each firm-year, I report insider sale activity during the pre-application and application years. The three measures o f insider sales
are #shares (number o f shares sold by insiders in millions during a year), Sshares (dollar value o f shares sold by insiders in millions during a year), and %equity
(number o f shares sold by insiders during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). All insiders trading data is from Thomson Insiders Filings database.
The differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests except that we use independent samples t-test to compare means for the sample o f
“influential patent” firms and the sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms. The p-values of differences are reported in the table.

Table 7
Univariate Test: Insiders ’ Net Purchases
Panel A: All insiders
“Influential patent”
firms
Statistic
(1)
Pre
(2)
Apply
Insider net buy
apply
year
year
measures
mean
-0.129
-0.247
#shares
Sshares
-4.931
-8.337
%equity
-0.005
-0.008

Panel B: Top management
“Influential patent”
Statistic
firms
(1)
Pre(2)
Insider net buy
apply
Apply
year
measures
year
mean
-0.038
-0.050
#shares
-1.657
-1.992
Sshares
%equity
-0.001
-0.001
Panel C: All insiders but blockholders
“Influential patent”
Statistic
firms
(1)
Pre(2)
apply
Insider net buy
Apply
year
year
measures

”No-influential
patent” firms
(3)
Pre(4)
Apply
appiy
year
year
-0.227
-6.784
-0.008

-0.355
-10.454
-0.011

”No-influential
patent” firms
(3)
Pre(4)
Apply
apply
year
year
-0.035
-1.225
-0.001

-0.049
-1.416
-0.002

”No-influential
patent” firms
(3)
Pre(4)
Apply
appiy
year
year

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
Apply
apply
year
year
-0.214
-13.041
-0.002

-0.253
-14.731
-0.003

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre(6)
Apply
apply
year
year
-0.047
-2.517
0.000

-0.053
-2.841
0.000

“Inconsequential
patent” firms
(5)
Pre
(6)
Apply
apply
year
year

p-values

(D-(2)
0.001
0.001
0.010

(l)-(3)
0.043
0.141
0.045

(1H 5)
0.008
0.000
0.019

(3)-(4)
0.144
0.142
0.071

(5)-(6)

(1-2)(3-4)

(1-2)(5-6)

0.222
0.454
0.021

0.917
0.922
0.999

0.114
0.444
0.206

(5)-(6)

(1-2)(3-4)

(1-2)(5-6)

0.290
0.280
0.881

0.872
0.711
0.058

0.580
0.982
0.327

(5)-(6)

(1-2)(3-4)

(1-2)(5-6)

p-values

(1>(2)
0.153
0.337
0.242

(l)-(3)
0.683
0.146
0.919

(l)-(5)
0.173
0.029
0.000

(3)-(4)
0.051
0.384
0.001

p-values

(D-(2)

0)-(3 )

(l)-(5)

(3)-(4)

Table 7 (Continued)
mean
#shares
-0.128
Sshares
-4.894
%equity__________ -0.005

-0.247
-8.334
-0.008

-0.227
-6.780
-0.008

-0.354
-10.436
-0.011

-0.214
-13.035
-0.001

-0.253
-14.726
-0.003

0.001
0.001
0.010

0.042
0.133
0.045

0.007
0.000
0.018

0.146
0.144
0.075

0.221
0.453
0.019

0.928
0.936
0.979

0.112
0.435
0.209

This table reports the mean values o f three measures of insider’ net purchases for “influential patent” firms and two control samples during the informed and
control periods. “Influential patent” firms consist o f firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. The two control samples are “no-influential patent”
firms and “inconsequential patent” firms. The informed period is the calendar year before a patent is filed. The control period is the calendar year a firm applies
for a patent. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the
USPTO classification.. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to
a control firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f
“inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its
technology sub-category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not
apply for any influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panel A to C show the
results for each o f three groups o f corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders but blockholders. The top management group consists of
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), and President in a firm. Blockholders are beneficial owners o f more than ten percent
of any class o f equity securities o f a firm. For each firm-year, I report insiders’ net purchase activity during the pre-application and application years. The three
measures o f insiders’ net purchases are #shares (net number of shares bought by insiders in millions during a year), Sshares (net dollar value o f shares bought by
insiders in millions during a year), and %equity (number of shares bought on the net during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). All insiders trading
data is from Thomson Insiders Filings database.The differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests except that we use independent samples ttest to compare means for the sample o f “influential patent” firms and the sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms. The p-values o f differences are reported in
the table.
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The three measures o f insider purchases are number of shares bought in millions
by insiders during a year (#shares), dollar value of shares bought in millions by insiders
during a year (Sshares), and percentage of outstanding equity bought by insiders during a
year (%equity). The dollar value of shares bought is the number of shares bought
multiplied by the transaction price reported on the TFI insider filing data.
Table 5 also reports p-values from t-tests. Between “influential patent” and “noinfluential patent” firms (p-values (l)-(2), (l)-(3), (3)-(4), (5)-(6), and (l-2)-(3-4)), twotailed paired t-tests is used for the difference in means. Between “influential patent” and
“inconsequential patent” firms (p-values (l)-(5) and (l-2)-(5-6)), two independent
samples t-tests are used for the differences in means. Column (l)-(2) (Column (3)-(4))
shows p-values o f test statistics for the change in the level of purchases of insiders in
“influential patent” firms (“no-influential patent” firms) between the pre-application and
control periods (i.e., the time-series control); Column (l)-(3) shows p-values for the
difference in the level of purchases of insiders in the pre-application period between
“influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms (i.e., the cross-sectional control);
and Column (l-2)-(3-4) is for the difference between (a) the change in the level of
purchases o f insiders in “influential patent” firms between the pre-application and control
periods and (b) the change in the level of purchases of insiders in “no-influential patent”
firms between the pre-application and control periods (i.e., DID, difference-in-differences
control). Similarly, for “inconsequential patent” firms, p-values are provided in Column
(l)-(5), Column (5)-(6), and Column (l-2)-(5-6).
Based on the time-series control, for “influential patent” firms, the group of top
management (Panel B) purchases significantly fewer stocks during the pre-application
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year than the control period, while the groups of all insiders and the all insiders but large
blockholders show similar and insignificant results. However, the level of their buying
appears to be normal based on either the cross-sectional or DID control for all three
groups in “influential patent” firms. Compared with top managers in “inconsequential
patent” firms, those in “influential patent” firms purchase significantly more stocks
during the informed period, though the mean dollar value of stocks they bought is not
unusual.
Insider Sales
Univariate results of insider sales are reported in Table 6. The format of Table 6 is
similar to that of Table 5, except that the measures of insider purchases are replaced by
the measures of insider sales. Based on the time-series control, Column (l)-(2) shows that
insiders in “influential patent” firms sell significantly fewer stocks during the pre
application year compared to the number they sell during the control year, which
indicates they delay their sales in the pre-application year until the application year.
Based on the cross-sectional control (Column (l)-(5)), insiders in “influential patent”
firms sell significantly fewer stocks than those in “inconsequential patent” firms in the
pre-application year. Both conclusions hold for each of three insider groups in Panel A to
Panel C, and for almost each of three measures of the level of insider sales, yet the
significant difference does not hold based on the DID control.
Table 6 provides evidence that insiders of firms with influential patents
significantly delay their stock sales during the pre-application year relative to the
application year, but the reduction relative to the delay is not significantly higher than the
changes observed from the insider sales in the control firms. The results preliminarily

support the explanation of passive insider trading. Insiders may postpone their planned
sales to avoid the penalties or notice from insider trading regulators.
Insider Net Purchases
Table 7 examines the level of stock net purchases of insiders. Based on the timeseries control (Column (l)-(2)), insiders in “influential patent” firms have significantly
higher level of net purchases during the pre-application year. The levels of insiders’ net
purchases in the two control samples do not have significant change. This pattern remains
consistent for both groups of all insiders and all insiders except for large blockholders in
“influential patent” firms. Based on the cross-sectional control (Column (l)-(5)), insiders
in “influential patent” firms purchase significantly more stocks on the net than those in
“inconsequential patent” firms in the pre-application year. Both conclusions hold for all
three insider groups in Panel A to Panel C, and for almost all three measures of the level
o f insider net purchases. Nevertheless, based on the DID control, no evidence indicates
unusual levels of net purchases by insiders in firms with influential patents during the
pre-application year.
In summary, the univariate results imply that while insiders generally keep their
purchases at the normal level, their net purchases are higher due to the lower level of
sales in the year before the filing of influential patents. This pattern is similar to the
profitable passive insider trading pattern of target firms’ insiders before takeover
announcements, as suggested in Agrawal and Nasser (2012).

Cross-Sectional Regressions
While univariate results provide some preliminary evidence under two sets of
controls: the time-series and cross-sectional control, they do not control for other
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determinants of the level of insider trading. I estimate cross-sectional regressions of the
level o f insider trading when controlling for other determinants. The regression results for
purchases, sales, and net purchases of three insiders groups are presented.
Regression Specification
Prior studies find that several factors influence the level of insider trading, such as
firm size, the level o f stock volatility, prior stock performance, stock liquidity, firm
valuation, and innovation. I attempt to control for these various factors in the crosssectional regressions, for the sample of “influential patent” firms and two control samples
respectively. All explanatory variables in the regression include two observations: One is
for the pre-application (informed) period and the other is for the control period. A binary
dummy variable ‘Pre-apply’ is used to represent the two observations, which equals one
if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre-application year and zero otherwise.
My model is constructed as Equation (4), and each measure of these control variables are
described below:
ITt =a^+ /?, Ln(Market_ Cap), + /?2cr, + f33PRETv + J34B /M _decilq+J3SR& D/Saleq
+ J3()Liquidity+ /?7Pr e_apply+eni = 1,2,...
Firm size (Ln(Market Cap)): Seyhun (1986) finds insiders are likely to be net
purchasers in small firms and net sellers in large firms. I control firm size by using the
natural logarithm of the market capitalization. Market cap is computed as the number of
total common shares outstanding times the share price at the last trading day during the
calendar year prior to the pre-application year or the application year on CRSP monthly
dataset.
Stock volatility (a): Meulbroek (2000) finds that insiders’ sales are more
aggressive in those more risky companies. The risk of a stock can be measured by the
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standard deviation of stock returns of a firm over all trading days during the year before
the pre-application year or the application year on CRSP daily dataset.
Prior stock performance (PRET.j): Lakonishok and Lee (2001) argue that insiders
tend to be contrarian investors who buy stocks when the past returns are low and sell
them when the past returns are high. Prior stock returns (PRET-i) are computed as the
buy-and-hold returns over one year prior to the pre-application year or the control year.
Firm valuation (B/M decile): Book-to-market (B/M) ratio is often used to
measure a firm’s valuation ratio relative to other firms. Jenter (2005) finds that insiders
trade like contrarian investors by purchasing (selling) a stock when the firm has a low
(high) valuation. The B/M ratio is computed by dividing the book value of equity by the
market capitalization of common shares outstanding at the end of calendar year before
the pre-application year or the control year. Based on NYSE B/M decile breakpoints in a
given year, B/M decile is assigned to one to ten depending on a firm’s B/M ratio.
Innovation (R&D/Sales): Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that R&D activities
create unique information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors,
and find that insider gains through insider trading in firms conducting R&D are
significantly larger than insider gains in firms with no R&D activities. R&D/Sales ratio is
R&D expenses to sales revenue for the last fiscal year before the pre-application or
control year. R&D expenses are treated as zero if R&D expenses are missing on
Compustat.
Stock liquidity: The market microstructure models developed by prior studies
(i.e., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) suggest that
informed traders are more likely to trade when stock liquidity is higher. I also control for
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stock liquidity, calculated as the mean daily trading volume divided by shares
outstanding during the pre-application or control year.
Pre-apply: Pre-apply is a binary dummy variable equal to one if the insider
trading activity occurs during the pre-application year and zero otherwise.
Controlling for those factors related to insider trading, I compare the regressions’
results between the sample of “influential patent” firms and the two control samples, the
sample o f “no-influential patent” firms and the sample of “inconsequential patent” firms.
The dependent variable (IT) is one of three measures of insider trading: 1) number of
shares (#shares), 2) dollar value of shares (Sshares), and 3) percentage of outstanding
equity (%equity) traded by insiders during the period. To reduce the influence from
outliers, the top and bottom one percent of the observations of the three dependent
variables in each regression are winsorized. Further, I control for industry and year fixed
effect in each regression model and calculate test statistics using robust variances.
Insider Purchases
I start by examining insider purchases in Table 8. Panel A shows coefficient
estimates and p-values from the regressions of all insiders’ purchases in the three
samples. Panel A.l lists the regression results in the sample of “influential patent” firms,
Panel A.2 is for the sample of “no-influential patent” firms, and Panel A.3 is for the
sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. My main interest is in the coefficient of ‘Pre
apply’, which measures the abnormal trading level of insiders in the pre-application year
relative to the application year (i.e., the control period).

Table 8
Regressions o f Insider Purchases
Panel A: All insiders' purchases
A. 1 “Influential patent” firms
Independent
Dependent variables
Variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
Ln(market cap)
0.000
0.060***
-0.001***
(0.869)
(0.003)
(0.000)
0.474***
a
0.191
0.023**
(0.000)
(0.859)
(0.046)
PRET(-l)
-0.002
0.034
0.000
(0.404)
(0.249)
(0.375)
B/M decile
-0.001
-0.016**
0.000
(0.130)
(0.048)
(0.711)
R&D/Sales
-0.000***
-0.000*
-0.000***
(0.005)
(0.067)
(0.008)
Liquidity
-0.693***
-3.969
-0.031**
(0.004)
(0.150)
(0.030)
Pre-apply
-0.001
-0.014
0.000
(0.776)
(0.763)
(0.177)
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
4220
4220
4220
Adjusted R2
0.025
0.029
0.05
Panel B: other insiders' purchases
B. 1 “Influential patent” firms
Insider Group
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.000
0.000
0.000
Top managers
(0.783)
(0.949)
(0.478)
All insiders but
-0.001
-0.013
0.000
blockholders
(0.783)
(0.766)
(0.179)

A.2 ”No-influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.001
0.061***
-0.001***
(0.468)
(0.001)
(0.000)
0.609**
2.252
0.026
(0.010)
(0.224)
(0.134)
-0.006***
-0.035*
-0.000***
(0.000)
(0.064)
(0.007)
-0.001
-0.011
- 0.000
(0.148)
(0.270)
(0.558)

(0.327)
Yes
Yes
4107
0.027

A.3 “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.001
0.069***
-0.000***
(0.351)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.707***
6.176***
0.022***
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.001)
-0.011***
-0.127***
-0.000***
(0.000)
(0.010)
(0.000)
0.000
0.015
- 0.000
(0.464)
(0.195)
(0.449)
- 0.000
-0.001
- 0.000
(0.644)
(0.342)
(0.778)
0.025
-0.289
-0.010***
(0.757)
(0.836)
(0.003)
-0.001
-0.021
- 0.000
(0.573)
(0.690)
(0.311)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3183
3183
3183
0.03
0.021
0.129

B.2 ”No-influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.000
0.004
0.000
(0.694)
(0.386)
(0.883)
-0.003
-0.034
0.000
(0.441)
(0.442)
(0.324)

B.3 “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.000
-0.002
0.000
(0.349)
(0.706)
(0.128)
-0.001
-0.02
0.000
(0.575)
(0.693)
(0.312)

0.000
(0.907)
-0.990***
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.449)
Yes
Yes
4107
0.024

-

0.000

(0.990)
-7.350**
(0.050)
-0.034
(0.453)
Yes
Yes
4107
0.034

-

0.000

(0.656)
-0.064**
(0.012)
-

0.000

Table 8 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions o f three measures o f insider purchases. “Influential patent” firms consist o f firms with
influential patents filed during 1987-2006. ”No-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms are two control samples.Influential patents are
identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. To construct the
matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest
market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists o f
firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER
database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the
sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Insider trading activities are measured during two periods for each
firm-year: One is the informed period, the year before the application year; the other is the control period, the year a firm applies for a patent. The dependable
variables include: #shares (number o f shares bought by insiders in millions during the year), Sshares (dollar value of shares bought by insiders in millions during
the year), and %equity (number o f shares bought during a year divided by number o f outstanding shares). The top and bottom one percent o f the observations o f
the dependent variables in each regression are winsorized. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share price at the end
of calendar year before pre-application year or application year. The standard deviation o f stock returns (o) is calculated over the year prior to pre-application
year or control year. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over one year prior to pre-application year or control year. B/M decile is assigned as one to
ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value o f equity divided by
market value o f equity ratio as o f the last year ending prior to the pre-application or application year. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the
last year before the pre-applying or applying year. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share outstanding during the pre-applying or
control year. Pre-apply is a dummy variable equal to one if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre-applying year and zero otherwise. Test statistics are
calculated using robust variance. Industry and year fixed effect are included in all regressions. Panel A shows coefficient estimates o f regressions o f measures o f
purchases by all corporate insiders. Panel B only reports the coefficient estimates of ‘Pre-apply’ variable for regressions o f measures o f purchases by top
management and by all insiders but blockholders. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent,
and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Panel B shows regression estimates and p-values of Equation (4) for the level of
purchases of the other two insider groups: top management and all insiders except for
large blockholders. For brevity, I only report coefficient estimates of the dummy variable
‘Pre-apply’. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists of 4,220 observations for
which all variables in the regressions have available data in CRSP and Compustat,
corresponding to 2,110 unique firm-years in which at least one influential patent was
filed. Similarly, the samples of “no-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent”
firms correspond to 2,054 and 1,592 firm-years, respectively.
Consistent with prior studies, Panel A in Table 8 provides evidence that, all
insiders purchase significantly more stocks when the firm is larger, has a higher stock
volatility, or has a lower prior stock return. I also find evidence that the level of insider
purchases is negatively related to R&D expense and liquidity. In all three samples,
estimated coefficients of the ‘Pre-apply’ variable are negative but not significantly
different from zero. It indicates, during the year before filing an influential patent, the
level of insiders’ purchases is not significantly abnormal, relative to their trading level
during the application year. This pattern remains constant for the other two insider groups
in Panel B.
Insider Sales
Table 9 reports the regression results of insider sales. The format of Table 9 is
similar to that of Table 8, except that three measures of insider purchases are replaced by
the measures of insider sales. In Panel A, the significant determinants of insiders’ sales
are almost the same as those of their purchases discussed in Panel A of Table 8, except
that insiders sell

significantly less when the firm

has a higher valuation.

Table 9
Regressions o f Insider Sales
Panel A: All insiders' sales
A l. “Influential patent” firms
Independent
Dependent variables
Variables
#shares
Sshares
0.067***
3.113***
Ln(market cap)
(0.000)
(0.000)
a
2.593***
55.583***
(0.000)
(0.001)
PRET(-l)
0.031**
1.876***
(0.016)
(0.000)
-0.011***
B/M decile
-0.205**
(0.024)
(0.000)
0.000
R&D/Sales
-0.001*
(0.957)
(0.099)
Liquidity
4.660***
188.299***
(0.007)
(0.002)
Pre-apply
-0.027*
-1.059**
(0.024)
(0.050)
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Year FE
Yes
Yes
N
4220
4220
0.137
Adjusted R2
0.203
Panel B: other insiders' sales
B .l. “Influential patent” firms
Insider Group
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
-0.007**
-0.211*
Top managers
(0.027)
(0.080)
All insiders but
-0.027**
-1.064**
blockholders
(0.049)
(0.023)

%equity
-0.002***
(0.000)
-0.014
(0.550)
0.002***
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.231)
0.223***
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.004)
Yes
Yes
4220
0.056

A2. ”No-influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.065***
2.265***
-0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
3.551***
27.167*
0.035
(0.000)
(0.060)
(0.279)
0.006
1.140***
0.001**
(0.542)
(0.005)
(0.042)
-0.017***
-0.380***
-0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.001**
-0.016
-0.000**
(0.037)
(0.113)
(0.024)
3.982
326.366***
0.203*
(0.173)
(0.000)
(0.095)
-0.022
-0.393
-0.002**
(0.281)
(0.457)
(0.010)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4107
4107
4107
0.141
0.073
0.042

A3. “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.070***
4.841***
-0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
9.673***
411.401***
0.090***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.162***
12.024***
0.003***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.010***
-0.731***
-0.000***
(0.007)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.001**
-0.078*
0.000
(0.035)
(0.050)
(0.172)
1.527*
47.726
-0.017
(0.075)
(0.329)
(0.109)
-0.004
0.128
-0.000**
(0.842)
(0.909)
(0.031)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3183
3183
3183
0.171
0.191
0.166

%equity
-0.000***
(0.007)
-0.002***
(0.004)

B.2. ”No-influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
-0.005
-0.064
-0.000**
(0.220)
(0.551)
(0.011)
-0.022
-0.381
-0.002**
(0.290)
(0.470)
(0.011)

B.3. “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.003
0.137
0.000
(0.503)
(0.607)
(0.499)
-0.004
0.127
-0.000**
(0.836)
(0.910)
(0.021)

Table 9 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions o f three measures of insider sales. “Influential patent” firms consist o f firms with influential
patents filed during 1987-2006. ”No-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms are two control samples. Influential patents are identified as
those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. To construct the matched
sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control firm-year with the closest market
capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential patent” firms consists o f firmyears in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub-category in the NBER
database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent during the
sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Insider trading activities are measured during two periods for each
firm-year: One is the informed period, the year before the application year; the other is the control period, the year a firm applies for a patent. The dependable
variables include: #shares (number o f shares sold by insiders in millions during the year), Sshares (dollar value o f shares sold by insiders in millions during the
year), and %equity (number of shares sold during a year divided by number of outstanding shares). The top and bottom one percent o f the observations o f the
dependent variables in each regression are winsorized. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share price at the end o f
calendar year before pre-application year or application year. The standard deviation of stock returns (a) is calculated over the year prior to pre-application year
or control year. PRET(-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over one year prior to pre-application year or control year. B/M decile is assigned as one to ten
depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value o f equity divided by
market value o f equity ratio as of the last year ending prior to the pre-application or application year. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the
last year before the pre-applying or applying year. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share outstanding during the pre-applying or
control year. Pre-apply is a dummy variable equal to one if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre-applying year and zero otherwise. Test statistics are
calculated using robust variance. Industry and year fixed effect are included in all regressions. Panel A shows coefficient estimates o f regressions o f measures of
sales by all corporate insiders. Panel B only reports the coefficient estimates of ‘Pre-apply’ variable for regressions o f measures o f sales by top management and
by all insiders but blockholders. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent
levels, respectively.
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As expected, the signs of ‘PRET’ and ‘Liquidity’ variables of their sales are
opposite to the signs o f purchases. For the sample of “influential patent” firms, estimated
coefficients o f the ‘Pre-apply’ variable are significantly negative for all three measures of
insider sales. On the other hand, estimated coefficients of ‘Pre-apply’ are not significantly
different from zero for the other two control samples, except for the %equity measure of
insider sales.
Panel B reports the similar pattern of insider sales for top management and all
insiders but blockholders. For top managers in “inconsequential patent” firms, even the
estimated coefficient of %equity measure of insider sales is not significant.
The distinct difference between the sample of “influential patent” firms and
control samples indicates that, during the pre-application year, the level of insiders’ sales
is significantly lower, relative to their trading level during the application year for
“influential patent” firms but not for control firms. This finding supports the notion that
insiders postpone their planned sales to increase their gains until the filing of influential
patents, when the market corporates the favorable information into the stock price.
Insider Net Purchases
The net effect of the delay in insiders’ purchases and sales is reported in Table 10.
After controlling for other determinants of insider trading, the level of net purchases of
insiders in “influential patent” firms is significantly higher during the pre-application
year than that during the control year. This conclusion holds for each of three insider
groups and for each o f three measures of the level of insiders’ net purchases.

Table 10
Regressions o f Insider Net Purchases
Panel A: All insiders' net purchases
Independent
Variables

Ln(market cap)

a
PRET(-l)
B/M decile
R&D/Sales
Liquidity
Pre-apply
Industry FE
Year FE
N
Adjusted R2

A. 1 “Influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
-2.949***
-0.065***
(0.000)
(0.000)
-2.036***
(0.000)
-0.032**
(0.013)
0.010***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.684)
-5.259***
(0.002)
0.024*
(0.087)
Yes
Yes
4220
0.135

-51.862***
(0.002)
-1.798***
(0.001)
0.189**
(0.034)
0.001
(0.145)
-191.233***
(0.001)
0.997**
(0.030)
Yes
Yes
4220
0.200

%equity
0.001***
(0.000)
0.038
(0.131)
-0.002***
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.762)
-0.246***
(0.000)
0.001**
(0.026)
Yes
Yes
4220
0.051

A.2 ”No-influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
%equity
Sshares
-0.061***
-2.170***
0.000
(0.000)
(0.110)
(0.000)
-2.731***
(0.002)
-0.014
(0.166)
0.015***
(0.001)
0.001**
(0.030)
-5.665**
(0.043)
0.015
(0.455)
Yes
Yes
4107
0.078

-25.869*
(0.069)
-1.166***
(0.004)
0.369***
(0.000)
0.016
(0.136)
-332.803***
(0.000)
0.356
(0.490)
Yes
Yes
4107
0.144

-0.008
(0.817)
-0.001***
(0.009)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.072)
-0.269**
(0.027)
0.002*
(0.051)
Yes
Yes
4107
0.037

A.3 “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
-0.069***
-4.760***
0.000***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.003)
-8.954***
(0.000)
-0.173***
(0.000)
0.010***
(0.006)
0.001**
(0.037)
-1.469*
(0.086)
0.002
(0.894)
Yes
Yes
3183
0.167

404.614***
(0.000)
-12.165***
(0.000)
0.746***
(0.000)
0.077*
(0.056)
-47.616
(0.330)
-0.144
(0.898)
Yes
Yes
3183
0.188

-0.058***
(0.006)
-0.003***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.225)
0.006
(0.610)
0.000
(0.106)
Yes
Yes
3183
0.121

Table 10 (Continued)
Panel B: Other insiders' net purchases
Insider Group

Top managers
All insiders but
blockholders

B.l. “Influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.204*
0.006**
0.000**
(0.048)
(0.091)
(0.024)
0.024*
1.002**
0.001**
(0.084)
(0.029)
(0.025)

B.2. ”No-influential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
Sshares
%equity
0.005
0.069
0.000***
(0.209)
(0.510)
(0.009)
0.014
0.343
0.002*
(0.471)
(0.505)
(0.053)

B.3. “Inconsequential patent” firms
Dependent variables
#shares
%equity
Sshares
-0.003
-0.139
0.000
(0.471)
(0.603)
(0.720)
0.003
-0.143
0.000*
(0.887)
(0.898)
(0.080)

This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions o f three measures of insiders’ net purchases (purchases minus sales). “Influential patent” firms
consist o f firms with influential patents filed during 1987-2006. ”No-influential patent” firms and “inconsequential patent” firms are two control samples.
Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the application year in its technology sub-category based on the USPTO
classification. To construct the matched sample o f “no-influential patent” firms, each firm-year in the sample o f “influential patent” firms is matched to a control
firm-year with the closest market capitalization in the same two-digit primary SIC code industry on Compustat in the same year. The sample o f “inconsequential
patent” firms consists o f firm-years in which at least one patent filed is ranked in the bottom ten percent most cited o f the application year in its technology sub
category in the NBER database. Both control samples are required to have corresponding data from Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any
influential patent during the sample period. All firms in the three samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Insider trading activities are measured
during two periods for each firm-year: One is the informed period, the year before the application year; the other is the control period, the year a firm applies for
a patent. The dependable variables include: #shares (net number o f shares bought by insiders in millions during the year), Sshares (net dollar value o f shares
bought by insiders in millions during the year), and %equity (number of shares bought on the net during a year divided by number of outstanding shares). The top
and bottom one percent o f the observations o f the dependent variables in each regression are winsorized. Market cap is computed as the number o f common
shares outstanding times the share price at the end o f calendar year before pre-application year or application year. The standard deviation o f stock returns (a) is
calculated over the year prior to pre-application year or control year. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over one year prior to pre-application year
or control year. B/M decile is assigned as one to ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M
is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value of equity ratio as of the last year ending prior to the pre-application or application year. R&D/Sales
ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the last year before the pre-applying or applying year. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by
share outstanding during the pre-applying or control year. Pre-apply is a dummy variable equal to one if the insider trading activity occurs during the pre
applying year and zero otherwise. Test statistics are calculated using robust variance. Industry and year fixed effect are included in all regressions. Panel A shows
coefficient estimates o f regressions of measures o f net purchases by all corporate insiders. Panel B only reports the coefficient estimates o f ‘Pre-apply’ variable
for regressions o f measures o f net purchases by top management and by all insiders but blockholders. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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On the other hand, for the two control samples, the level of insiders’ net purchases
in the pre-application year is not significantly different from those in the control period.
The finding indicates that the level of stock net purchases of insiders is significantly
higher due to the lower level of their sales in the pre-application year before filing an
influential patent, even though the level of their actual purchases does not change. This
trading pattern is similar to the passive trading pattern of target firms’ insiders before
takeover announcements in Agrawal and Nasser (2012). There is no evidence of such
passive trading in two control samples.

Summary and Conclusions
In this study, I empirically examine whether insiders trade shares based on a
firm’s innovation output, measured by the filing of an influential patent. Using patents as
a proxy for innovation output, I analyze insiders’ open market trading in a sample of
2,470 firm-years in which influential patents were filed during the period 1987-2006. We
define influential patents as those top ten-percent most cited patents of the application
year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I
compare the level of insider trading in the sample of “influential patent” firms to the level
in each o f two control samples, an industry-year-size matched sample of “no-influential
patent” firms and an unmatched sample of “inconsequential patent” firms. I separately
examine insiders’ purchases, sales and net purchases during the pre-application year (an
informed period) and the application year (a control period) for each of three samples.
For each sample, I focus on the open market stock transactions of three groups of
corporate insiders: all insiders, top management, and all insiders except for large
blockholders.

In regressions controlling for other factors related to insider trading, I find an
interesting pattern of insider trading activities for the “influential patent” firms during the
calendar year before an influential patent is applied for. Insiders in “influential patent”
firms reduce their purchases in the pre-application year, though not significantly, relative
to their trading level during the application year. Nevertheless, their net purchases are
significantly higher for the same period due to the significantly larger reductions in their
sales. This pattern of passive trading holds true for each insider group and for each of
three measures o f insider trading. I find no such significantly consistent pattern in the
“no-influential patent” and “inconsequential patent” firms. The passive trading pattern of
insiders in “influential patent” firms is similar to the findings of Agrawal and Nasser
(2012) on the trading behavior of target firms’ insiders before takeover announcements.
My findings suggest that managers have strong information advantages in
discriminating the quality of patents even before the application of patents, and they tend
to engage in passive insider trading activities only before an influential patent is filed.

CHAPTER TWO

EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTION EXERCISES AND OPTION
GRANTS DURING THE APPLICATION PROCESS
OF INFLUENTIAL PATENTS

Introduction
Corporate insiders are well known to possess superior information about a firm’s
future performance, and they may utilize that information advantage to earn private
benefits. This study empirically investigates whether exercising and awarding executive
stock options (ESO) are correlated with firms’ innovation output, represented by the
application of an influential patent. Aboody and Lev (2000) study research and
development (R&D) expenses, a major innovation input, as a potential source of personal
gains from insider trading given the relative scarcity of public information on firms’
R&D activities and the importance of R&D activities to firms’ profit potential. They
argue that R&D activities create unique information asymmetries between corporate
insiders and outside investors, and they find that personal gains from insider trading in
firms conducting R&D are significantly larger than those in firms with no R&D
activities. Given the uncertainty and inefficiency of the innovation process, the outcomes
of innovation, rather than R&D expenditures, provide better information on the
innovation’s potential economic impact on firms’ future performance. Using patents to
proxy for innovation output, I hypothesize that patents, especially influential patents
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(patents that are ranked in the top ten percent most cited for the technology sub-category
in the application year), contribute most to information asymmetry, and that some
insiders may exploit this asymmetry to earn profits from ESO exercises or option grants.
I explore ESO exercises and option grants during the application process of an
influential patent for three reasons. First, I focus on ESO exercises and option grants in
the year prior to the filing date of an influential patent, as insiders have more private
information during this period when the firm is preparing the patent application after an
early stage of R&D. Information about influential patents is revealed at different stages to
different stakeholders (Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Even in the stage of filing for a
patent, information about the innovation may be kept confidential until the patent is
granted since the public disclosure of the patent application is not required (Ahuja, Coff,
and Lee, 2005). Generally, it takes about two years for a patent application to be granted
(Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Therefore, information asymmetries between
managers and investors exist during the lengthy process of patent application. The
information advantage provides managers a long time lag to pursue personal interests
through conducting insider trading or influencing the timing of option grants.
Accordingly, I investigate ESO exercises and grants around the filing and granting dates
of influential patents.
Secondly, I center on influential patents since the significance or value of each
individual patent varies enormously. Among the large amounts of patents granted in the
U.S every y ear,3 only a few are extremely valuable, while many others have
comparatively little value (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984). To evaluate the significance
3 According to Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), over 150,000 patents are granted by the US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) every year.

of a firm’s innovation requires expertise in the relevant field and the knowledge of the
future development o f an industry. It is hard for most outsiders who possess little
knowledge to determine the importance of a firm’s patent. Even when a patent (the
innovation outcome) is granted with detailed technical information, most outside
investors would not be able to estimate its economic potential. However, executives who
are aware of the innovation since its inception (several years) possess large amounts of
private information. They may have a strong notion of a patent’s ultimate importance as
early as the stage of preparing for the patent application. Therefore, during a patent’s
application

process,

executives

may

engage

in

profitable

trading

activities

opportunistically since they are better informed than outsiders about the high future value
of an influential patent.
Thirdly, I concentrate on informed ESO exercises and unscheduled option awards.
Executives may be more likely to engage in opportunistic option-related activities for
personal gains than engage in common stock trading when they possess private
information about the quality of a patent. Exercising ESOs and granting options may be
motivated by a number of other factors unrelated to private information. It is not easy for
outsiders to distinguish option exercises and grants likely to be associated with private
information from those that are not. Therefore, the opportunistic option exercises and
option awards may receive less attention from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) than insiders’ open market transactions.
Unlike open market trading, executives lose the time value of money associated
with the ESO exercise price by exercising options prior to the expiration. However,
executives may offset this loss with the profits gained from their private information.

Early exercise occurs when the benefits from the private information outweigh the costs
related with early exercise. Specifically, I exclude the exercises motivated by other
factors unrelated to private information, such as liquidity, diversification, and dividend
capture, and exclusively focus on potentially informed exercises which are more likely to
contain private information. Therefore, compared to insiders’ common stock trading, the
informed option exercises may be associated more with material information regarding
future stock price performance. Using the method in Brooks, Chance, and Cline (2012)
and Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2012), I identify informed option exercises as those
exercised early, not around a vesting or ex-dividend date, and where the underlying
shares were immediately sold.
Since most options have an exercise price equal to the stock’s market price at the
grant date, the timing o f stock options awards is crucial enhancing the executives’ option
value. Executives prefer to receive options on dates when the company stock price is
relatively low. Previous studies find that managers are aware of the change of their firm’s
stock price due to innovation (i.e. Ciftci, Lev, and Radhakrishnan, 2011; Barth, Kasznik,
and McNichols, 2001; Gu, 2005; Ciftici, 2012); therefore, top executives may exploit this
foresight by influencing the timing of option awards. Most companies have schedules to
grant options to top executives on roughly the same dates of every year; therefore, it is
unlikely that executives can influence the timing of these scheduled option grants. The
unscheduled option grants, however, are more flexible and more likely to contain related
private information. Following Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007), I identify an option
award as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day of the one-year anniversary of
the prior year’s award date. I hypothesize that corporate executives may be awarded more

unscheduled stock options before the filing of an influential patent when the stock price
has not appreciated, and may receive less unscheduled stock options after the filing date.
Based on the patents literature, I define an influential patent as one with high
future citation impact. Trajtenberg (1990) argues that simple patent counts are not
informative about innovative output. He then claims that citations are a better indicator of
the value of innovations and thus overcome the limitations of simple counts. An
influential patent, which may explore a new area of technology, or is the first to find
solutions to long-standing problems, is the most valuable. When granted, a patent is
required to cite all previous patents upon which this new technology builds. Influential
patents are expected to receive more citations in the future since subsequent innovations
may be built upon the initial technology. Recent studies have shown that citations of a
patent contain valuation-relevant information and may be used as an accurate measure of
the patent’s value (see, e.g. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005; Gu, 2005; Matolcsy and
Wyatt, 2008; McGahee, 2011; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011). Since citations are
generally received for years after the initial patent is granted and suffer from a truncation
bias,4 1 measure the impact o f a patent by using the total adjusted citations received by
the patent. Specifically, I define an influential patent as one that is ranked in the top ten
percent most cited o f the application year for the three-digit technology sub-category
based on the USPTO classification.
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The older patents have less truncation issue. For example, a patent that was granted in 1999 would have
much more time to receive citations than a patent created in 2004 because the patent data used in the paper
ends in 2006. Following Flail, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001,2005), I multiply the number of citations by a
weighting index to correct for the truncation bias. The index is higher for later years.

Applying patent data compiled from patent filings with the US Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), I
examine ESO exercises for 654 firm-events, each with an influential patent filed during
the period 1996-2006, and 654 industry-year-size-performance matched control firmevents with non-influential patents filed, both during an informed and a control period.
The one-year period prior to the filing date of a patent is defined as the informed period,
and the one-year period following the patent’s filing date is defined as the control period.
I study the change of the aggregated option exercises by all insiders in a firm during the
informed period and the control period. The difference-in-differences (DID) methodology
is used in the analysis.
In regressions of measures of ESO exercises controlling for related factors, I find
a significant pattern of delayed option exercises from one year before filing the
influential patent until the year after that. Compared to exercises over the year following
the filing date of an influential patent, executives significantly reduce their option
exercises in the informed period. No such pattern of significantly delayed option
exercises is present in the matched control sample. It is reasonable to assume that
executives are cognizant that their private information on the potential value of influential
innovation will gradually be incorporated into the stock price after the filing of a patent.
Therefore, executives may delay exercising their options until the stock price runs up to
maximize their stock option compensation. The pattern of reducing ESO exercises before
an influential patent’s filing date is similar to the evidence from Agrawal and Nasser
(2012) which indicates insiders of target firms significantly reduce stock sales before
takeover announcements.

Next, I examine whether executives influence unscheduled option grants with the
expectation of appreciation in the stock value after an influential patent is filed by the
firm. I discover no evidence o f abnormal option grants around the application date of an
influential patent. However, when the informed period is redefined as the one-year period
before granting a patent and the control period as the year after that, I do find that
executives receive more options in the year before the grant date of an influential patent
than the year after the grant date. There is no such pattern o f option grants in the matched
control sample. Although the grant date of an influential patent depends upon the review
process at the USPTO, top executives may be able to forecast the approximate date and
have more confidence in the potential appreciation of stock price after the announcement
of the patent being granted. The results are supported by the point I discussed earlier that
information about a firm’s innovation may be kept confidential until the patent is granted
(Ahuja, Coff, and Lee, 2005). Consistent with prior studies; I find that executives’ option
grants coincide with the stock’s price change, which is more significant around the grant
date than around the filing date of an influential patent. This finding further demonstrates
that managers have an informational advantage over patent production and they may
benefit from it through timing unscheduled option awards.

Background on Executive Stock Option Exercises,
Option Grants, Innovation, and Patents
Executive Stock Option Exercises
Executive stock options have been broadly used as a form of performance based
incentive compensation to align the long-term interests of shareholders and managers.
The large amounts of option grants also provide executives with incentives to act

opportunistically to maximize the expected value of their stock and option portfolios.
Generally, ESOs are non-transferable, non-hedgeable, and have vesting restrictions
(forfeitable). It is reasonable for risk-averse, wealth-undiversified executives to exercise
their options early for diversification or liquidity needs. Existing literature mainly
examines the motives and policies of exercise behavior and provides substantial evidence
that a considerable number of stock options are exercised early (see, e.g., Ofek and
Yermack, 2000; Hall and Murphy, 2002; Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon, 2005). Fu and
Ligon (2010) summarize a number of reasons to optimally exercise an ESO early, such as
capturing the current intrinsic value by risk-averse executives, diversifying away the
unsystematic risk associated with an underdiversified portfolio, liquidity needs of
executives, or insider information. By segregating the private information factor from
several other motivating factors in early exercises, Brooks, Chance and Cline (2012) find
that early exercises account for about 94% of all exercises and there is strong evidence
indicating that executives use private information when exercising their stock options.
One objective of my study is to identify the specific source of insiders’
information leading to early exercises of stock options. The majority of previous studies
investigate the information content of ESO exercises for future returns, but evidence is
mixed. Considering the regulatory change on the periods of holding exercised options in
May 1991,5 Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find during 1992-1995, insider exercises are
preceded by positive stock returns in the weeks prior to exercises, and are not followed
by negative abnormal stock returns after exercises except for top managers at small firms.
5 Before May 1991, insiders had to hold the stock acquired through option exercise for six months. This
holding restriction was removed in May 1991, thus insiders have been able to sell acquired shares
immediately if the options have been hold for at least six months.

They conclude that insiders do not use insider information to time exercises since insiders
have been able to sell acquired shares immediately. In contrast, Huddart and Lang (2003)
examine the option exercises by employees at seven firms, and find that when option
exercises are high, stock returns in the next six months are ten percent lower than when
option exercises are low. They then argue that the exercise decisions of both executives
and junior employees contain price-relevant information. Using data between 1996 and
2005, Brooks, Chance and Cline (2012) also document significantly lower abnormal
returns following exercises for samples that should be motivated by private information
than samples that should not. It is broadly accepted that if executives have negative
information, they would sell shares immediately after exercises, and the stock would
more likely perform poorly for a period after exercises. In another context, influential
patents play a significant role in maintaining the firms’ competitive edge and deciding the
firms’ future value. The filing of an influential patent would signal positive information
for executives in enhancing the firm’s market performance. One may wonder about the
pattern of option exercises when executives have positive information on the quality of a
patent. Therefore, I examine whether corporate executives use private information to time
the exercises of stock options when the firm has an influential innovation on the way.
Specifically, I focus on exercises that are identified as potentially informed exercises,
based on the method used in previous option literature (Brooks, Chance, and Cline, 2012;
Bradley, Cline, and Lian, 2012).

Option Grants
One key feature of options is that the exercise price of an option is equal to the
stock’s market price on the grant date. This feature makes the timing of stock options

awards crucial in enhancing the executives’ option value. Executives prefer to receive
options on dates when the company stock price is relatively low. According to Lie
(2005), if executives can influence the timing of a grant, they might time it to occur either
after an expected stock price decrease or before an anticipated stock price increase.
Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kaszznik (2000) provide evidence that CEOs receive
stock option awards shortly before the favorable corporate news. Yermack (1997) argues
that CEOs time option grants before good news or after bad news. Aboody and Kaszznik
(2000) concentrate on a sample of firms with fixed award schedules and document that
CEOs manipulate the timing of the news disclosure around scheduled option awards by
delaying positive information or rushing negative information. Compared with scheduled
option awards, which occur on nearly identical award dates every year, unscheduled
option awards provide executives with more flexibility to manipulate and enhance the
value o f their awards. Focusing on a sample of unscheduled awards, Lie (2005) first
proposes the “backdating hypothesis” to explain the systematically favorable stock price
patterns surrounding option grant dates documented in earlier studies. Lie reports that the
predicted returns from the three-factor model are abnormally low before unscheduled
ESO awards and abnormally high afterward. Other than the “backdating hypothesis”,
another possible explanation suggested by Lie is that executives might have an
informational advantage that allows them to develop superior forecasts regarding future
market movements. When executives have positive information, they may expect future
price increases and thus influence the unscheduled options to be awarded when a firm’s
stock price hits a low point.
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More recently, Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) find that unscheduled options are
awarded to many target firms’ CEOs during private merger negotiations as a substitute
for golden parachutes and compensation for the benefits they forfeit because o f the
merger. Their results show that when target CEOs expect large pay losses after the
merger goes through, their firms are more likely to extend them unscheduled options
during merger negotiations. Ali, Wei, and Zhou (2011) examine option grant timing in
response to fire sales and purchases of stocks by mutual funds. Their study illustrates that
insiders enhance personal benefits by influencing the timing of option grants in response
to the underpricing of their stock caused by fund-flow-induced price pressure.

Innovation and Patents
Technological innovation in general brings long-term economic benefits to firms

(Griliches, 1984, 2000). At the same time, innovation-intensive firms present more severe
information asymmetries. Ciftci, Lev, and Radhakrishnan (2011) find that, compared
with low R&D intensity firms which mimic and extend existing technologies, high R&D
intensity firms which engage in basic research activities are likely to suffer from higher
information asymmetry. In general, innovation-intensive firms share several common
features, such as owning a relatively large amount of intangible assets, utilizing more
resources for technology and innovation, and being more likely to have a fast changing
technical environment, which increase the difficulty for market participants to accurately
assess the firm’s future prospects. Because intangible assets typically are unrecognized
and estimates of their fair values are not disclosed, investors depend more on analyst
information in R&D-intensive firms (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols, 2001). However,
even investors and analysts cannot fully value the implication of enhanced innovation
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capabilities and underestimate future earnings of R&D-intensive firms (Gu, 2005; Ciftici,
2012). Furthermore, CEOs or top executives in R&D-intensive companies are mostly
engineers or experts in their field, which increases the difficulty of monitoring by
shareholders who are without the relevant technology knowledge. Therefore, compared to
other firms, R&D-intensive firms generally have a less effective and less efficient
monitoring mechanism, which, accordingly, provides top managers in R&D-intensive
firms more flexibility to pursue their own interests.
Existing studies have paid little attention to the role of innovation as an important
source o f information asymmetries leading to executives’ personal gains from insider
trading. Focusing on R&D expenditures, Aboody and Lev (2000) point out that R&D is a
major contributor to information asymmetry and that some insiders will exploit this
asymmetry to gain from insider trading. Their findings indicate that insider gains in
R&D-intensive firms are substantially larger than those in firms without R&D. According
to Coff and Lee (2003), investors may assume that insider trading reflects managers’
attempts to profit from their private information and view managerial trading as a signal
about the firm’s prospects. They test the relationship between R&D intensity and investor
responses to announcements of insider-trading events. They find that insider purchases
generate larger positive stock price reactions for R&D-intensive firms, which indicates
that insider purchases have greater signaling value to investors in R&D firms.
Patents, an important indicator of innovative output, have been broadly used in
the literature as a measure of an individual firm’s technological progress. Using patent
citations to proxy for the economic value of innovation, Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011)
find that a firm’s future operating performance is positively associated with the quality of

patents. Gu (2005) and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) find similar evidence. After
analyzing the association between technology competition and bankruptcy, Eisdorfer and
Hsu (2011) show that technologically innovative firms are less likely to go bankrupt.
Hsu, Lee, Liu, and Zhang (2011) use a firm’s patent records to measure its innovation
competitiveness, and find that patenting activities provide valuable incremental
information to bondholders beyond R&D investments. They report that non-insider
bondholders use the number of granted patents and associated citations to assess the
economic value o f innovations and to price bonds of patent-owning firms accordingly.
The conclusion from these studies is that patents provide useful information in evaluating
a firm’s innovative capability and understanding the relationship between innovation and
financial performance.
When granted, a patent is required to cite all previous patents upon which this
new technology builds. Accordingly, an influential patent can represent a platform upon
which future innovations will be based and is expected to receive more citations in the
future. These studies have shown that citations contain valuation-relevant information
and may be used as an accurate measure of the patent’s value. After multiplying the
number o f citations by a weighting index to correct for the truncation bias (Hall, Jaffe,
and Trajtenberg, 2001 and 2005), I use total adjusted citations received to measure the
success and the value of a patent. I identify influential patents as those ranked in the top
ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its three-digit technology sub
category based on the USPTO classification.
However, as a source of information asymmetry and an incentive for insider
trading, patents have received much less attention in existing research. Ahuja, Coff, and
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Lee (2005) study insider trading on knowledge of imminent breakthroughs, and find that
managers purchase stock well before breakthrough patents are filed. They define
breakthrough patents as patents which were filed and ranked in the top ten percent most
heavily cited in their technology subfield. However, their conclusions are based on only
three years’ patent data from 1988 to 1990. By examining 88 U.S. listed firms with the
heaviest patenting for the period 1987 to 1998, Rong (2012) finds strong evidence that a
firm’s insider trading patterns are significant in explaining the unexpected fluctuations in
patent output when controlling for R&D input effect. Rong’s finding supports the
argument that management has privileged knowledge about its R&D productivity.
Most related literature focuses on insiders’ common stock transactions. Stock
transactions, however, are not the only means by which executives can exploit private
information on innovation. The extensive use of stock options as compensation provides
executives with another means of exploiting private information on the quality of
patterns. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to examine ESO exercises
and option grants around the filing of influential patents.

Sample Selection and Data Description
Sample o f “Influential Patent” Firms
The sample is constructed from several databases. Patent data come from the
updated National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database, originally
developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and revised as of August, 2010. ESO
exercises and option grants data is taken from Thomson Financial Insiders Filings
database (TFI), which covers the period 1996 to 2007. Stock return and price data is
gathered from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and financial data is

from Compustat. The NBER database includes detailed information on all patents granted
by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during the period 1976 - 2006. Patent
citations, the key indicator of patent value, suffer from a truncation bias since citations
are generally received for years after the patent was granted. The patents that were
granted in early years would have more time to receive citations than those granted in
more recent years. Thus, each patent’s citation is adjusted by multiplying with a
truncation weight index, from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), and also found in the
NBER patent dataset. The NBER data contains the grant dates and the grant years of all
patents in the file; however, it only contains the application years for patents granted.
Since I investigate executives’ option exercises and option grants around the filing date
of an influential patent, I collect the application date for each influential patent from the
USPTO’s website. The application date is then used as the relevant event time for the
study o f executives’ option behavior.
The initial patent data is constructed using all patents applied for during the
period 1996-2006, 6 except those missing a unique assignee number, or missing a citation
truncation weight as of 2006, or with the status ‘M’ (missing) or ‘W’ (withdrawn).
Specifically, I define influential patents as patents that are ranked in the top ten percent
most cited of the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category in the NBER
database, and whose total adjusted citations are not equal to zero. I then eliminate
observations (influential patents) with firm-years not listed, or which have incomplete
coverage in CRSP, Compustat, or the TFI insider filings database. To avoid overlap, if a
firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine the

6 My option data ends in 2007 since the patent data ends in 2006 and I need one year o f option exercise
data after the application o f a patent.
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influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years (730 days). This
method leads to the final sample of 654 influential patents filed by 564 distinct firms. For
the sample of “influential patent” firms, only one influential patent is included for each
firm in a single year.
The USPTO continuously updates its classification system (about 400 three-digit
patent classes) for the patented inventions. The 654 influential patents belong to 216
patent classes. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) develop a higher-level classification
and aggregate all the classes into six main categories: Chemical (excluding Drugs);
Computers and Communications; Drugs and Medical; Electrical and Electronics;
Mechanical; and Others. Based on their classification, I present the distribution of
technology classes for the sample of influential patents in Table 11. Average cites and
adjusted cites (the citation times the truncation weight index) are also provided. More
than one quarter (28%) of these influential patents belong to the Computers and
Communications category. They also have the highest average citation count at 22.1 and
adjusted citation count at 68.95. The remaining influential patents distribute almost
evenly among the other five categories from 11.3% to 17.4%.
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Table 11
Summary Statistics o f Influential Patents
Cat.
Code

Category Name

# of
influential
patents

Percentage
Count

Average
Cites

Average Cites
Adjusted for
Truncations

1

Chemical

78

11.9%

10.44

31.33

2

Computers & Communications

183

28.0%

22.10

68.95

3

Drugs & Medical

99

15.1%

12.17

36.17

4

Electrical & Electronic

114

17.4%

13.37

42.43

5

Mechanical

74

11.3%

13.16

35.64

6

Others

106

16.2%

12.43

34.96

Total

654

100.0%

15.11

45.6

This table provides the distribution of technology classes, average cites, and average adjusted cites for the
sample o f 654 influential patents. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited
patents o f the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO
classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero.
To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The adjusted cite is computed as
the citation times the truncation weight index from the NBER patent dataset.

The Cross-Sectional Matched Sample
A matched control sample is constructed to compare abnormal informed option
exercise behavior and assess abnormal performance. Since option exercises often follow
periods of positive performance, for each firm-event in the sample of “influential patent”
firms, a matched firm is identified according to industry, year, size, and prior firm
performance. The matched sample of “no-influential patent” firms is required to have
corresponding data on Compustat and CRSP datasets, with at least one prior-year return
on CRSP and have stock options available on the TFI filing dataset. The same control
sample is also used for the comparison of abnormal unscheduled option grants.
To construct the potential matching pool, I first keep firms with patents whose
citations are ranked below the median value of citations of its three-digit technology class
in the application year. I then exclude any firm with influential patents filed during the

period 1996 to 2006. For each firm-year in the sample of “influential patent” firms, I
identify all “no-influential patent” firms in the pool of possible matching firms within the
same two-digit primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in the same year.
Following the matching procedure in Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2012), I then choose a
matching firm which has an absolute percentage difference o f market capitalization less
than ten percent, and has the minimum absolute percentage difference of prior-year
returns between the sample and matching firms. If a potential matching firm-year cannot
be found from the same two-digit SIC industry, I repeat the same procedure on the same
one-digit SIC industry, then I run the matching process again without the industry
requirement. If it is still not able to match all firm-years, I relax the restriction on the
percentage differences of market capitalization to be 100%. For the remaining matching,
I relax the restriction on the percentage differences of prior-year returns and add the
requirement for the minimum difference of market capitalization. The matching
procedures are without replacement. A matching firm may apply for more than one patent
in the matched year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with
the lowest value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event, and then I collect
the application date for each patent from the USPTO’s website. Finally, the matched
sample of “no-influential patent” firms consists of 654 firm-events, corresponding to 393
distinct firms. Only one patent is included for each firm in a single year.
Table

12 reports mean and median values of financial and operating

characteristics for the sample of “influential patent” firms and control sample. Using pvalues of t-tests and median tests, Table 12 also reports differences in means and in
medians between “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms.
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Table 12
Descriptive Statistics o f Sample Firms

Firm size
Market value of equity
($ mill.)
Sales ($ mill.)
Total assets ($ mill.)
Firm value ($ mill.)
Stock volatility and Drior returns
o(%)
PRET(-l) (%)
Growth
B/M
Firm value/Total assets
Sales growth rate (%)
Operating performance (%)
OPA(-l)
OPA(-2)
OPA(-3)
OPA
Financial leverage
Long-term debt/total
assets
Long-term debt/firm
value

Mean

Median

(1)
(2) ”Nop-value
“Influential influential (D-(2)
patent” firms patent” firms

p-value
(1)
(2) ”No“Influential influential (l)-(2)
patent” firms patent” firms

2045
1362
3255
4678

2475
1789
2489
4184

0.392
0.246
0.555
0.737

411
216
267
568

401
226
254
536

0.843
0.710
0.755
0.843

4.04
36.82

4.15
25.53

0.356
0.073

3.81
10.00

3.80
6.88

1.000
0.378

0.47
2.88
15.24

0.50
2.57
13.17

0.118
0.056
0.418

0.38
1.90
8.83

0.41
1.75
7.74

0.049
0.073
0.462

2.26
1.98
2.29
1.91

-1.10
-0.92
1.00
0.04

0.024
0.133
0.556
0.299

8.49
8.57
9.29
8.24

6.28
7.81
8.45
7.42

0.002
0.381
0.281
0.223

0.14

0.15

0.185

0.07

0.09

0.231

0.09

0.10

0.094

0.03

0.04

0.189

This table provides summary statistics o f firm characteristics for the sample o f “influential patent” firms
and control sample. The sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed
during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the
application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude
those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a
firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those influential patents
whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential patent” firms is the
industry-year-size-performance matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists o f firms
with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation o f its technology class in the
application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI,
and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, 1
identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary SIC code, an absolute
percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference of prioryear returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched
year. To construct the sample o f “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest value o f citations is
randomly chosen for each firm-event.
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Table 12 (Continued)
All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each o f the “influential patent”
and the “no-influential patent” firms consists o f 654 firm-events. Market value of equity is measured at the
end o f calendar year prior to the filing date. Firm value equals (book value o f total assets - book value of
equity + market value o f equity). Firm value, sales, total assets, and financial leverage ratios are for the
fiscal year prior to the application year. Stock return volatility (o) is the standard deviation of stock returns
over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the application date o f a patent. PRET(-l) (prior stock returns) is
computed as the buy-and-hold returns over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the application date. B/M is
calculated as book value o f equity divided by market value o f equity as o f the end o f the last calendar year
before the year applying a patent. Sales growth is defined as [sales(-l)/sales(-5)],/4-l. OPA(t) is the
operating performance to total assets for year t relative to the application year (t=0). Operation performance
is operating income before depreciation. OPA is the mean o f OPA(t), equal to (OPA(-l)+OPA(-2)+OPA(3))/3. Other than what is stated, all other financial data are from Compustat. The differences in means
between two samples are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians are
tested by Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test. P-values are reported.

The two samples are comparable in most measures of financial and operating
characteristics. Measures of firm size, financial leverage and the first two growth
measures are for the end of the last fiscal year before a patent is filed. All measures of
firm size indicate that two samples are similar in size, with a mean market capitalization
(total assets) of $2,045 million ($3,255 million) in “influential patent” firms and $2,475
million ($2,489 million) in “no-influential patent” firms. The mean daily stock volatility
in “influential patent” firms is 4.04%, similar to the one in “no-influential patent” firms,
4.15%. Two growth measures, the B/M ratio and sales growth ratio, show that the growth
opportunities are similar in the two groups. Measured by operating income before
depreciation to total assets, the average operating performance over the prior three years
has no significant difference between the two samples. The measures of financial
leverage for the two samples are very close as well. The prior stock returns are
significantly different at ten percent level.

Time-Series Control
For each observation in the sample of “influential patent” firms and the matched
control sample, I compare the levels of informed option exercises and unscheduled option
grants during the informed and control periods. The informed period is the one-year
period before a patent’s filing date (the pre-application period), and the control period is
the one-year period after that (the post-application period). I examine informed option
exercises between the pre-application and post-application periods of a patent because, as
I discussed, generally, insiders exercise their stock options more frequently when the
stock price is high and less frequently when the stock price is low. With the foresight and
confidence that the market will gradually realize the economic value of an influential
patent and incorporate this information into the stock price, executives would like to
postpone their informed option exercises until the price runs up in the year after an
influential patent has been filed.

Stock-Price Reaction when an Influential/
Inconsequential Patent Is Granted
I verify the positive association between influential patents and the filing firm’s
future stock performance by examining the stock-price reaction when an influential
patent is granted. For comparison, I further present corresponding reaction when a noninfluential patent is granted.
The abnormal return of stock i on day t is computed as:
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where rj and rm are the stock returns for firm i and the market, respectively. The market
return is the return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index. I then calculate the
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for firm i over days (ti, t2) as:

c^ = i> .-

(«)

'= '1

Table 13 reports the mean and median values of CARs and the average CARs
differences for the samples of “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms over
three windows covering the trading days (-1, +1), (-5, +5) and (-20, +5) around the
announcement date of a patent being granted (day 0). Since some firms have no available
return data on CRSP around the patent’s grant date, the observation size for influential
patents granted (non-influential patents granted) is 649 (641), corresponding to 564 (393)
applying firms in 654 (654) application firm-events.

Table 13
Stock-Price Reaction when an Injluential/Non-influential Patent Is Granted
Days around announcement
Category

(1) Influential patents
granted
(p-value)
(2) Non-influential
patents granted
(p-value)
(1) vs. (2) difference
(p-value)

N

649

641

Mean

Median

(-U + 1)

(-5, +5)

(-20, +5)

(-U + 1)

(-5, +5)

(-20, +5)

0.53**

1.33**

1.94**

-0.07

0.03

1.05

(0.0351)

(0.0136)

(0.0139)

(0.3980)

(0.2916)

(0.1229)

0.30

0.91*

2.50***

-0.11

0.08

0.25*

(0.4012)

(0.0918)

(0.0023)

(0.7222)

(0.5311)

(0.0641)

0.23

0.42

-0.56

0.04

-0.05

0.80

(0.5937)

(0.5810)

(0.6204)

(0.8675

(0.8674)

(0.3440)

This table reports the mean/median cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and average CARs differences for
three windows around a patent’s granting date (day 0) for the samples o f “influential patent” firms and “noinfluential patent” firms. The sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents
filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents o f the
application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude
those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero.
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Table 13 (Continued)
To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential
patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance matched control sample. The pool for the control
sample consists o f firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on
Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each
“influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit
primary SIC code, an absolute percentage difference of market capitalization less than ten percent, and the
minimum difference of prior-year returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for
multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample o f “no-influential patent”, one patent with the
lowest value of citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on
the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. There are 649 (641) influential patents (non-influential patents) with
available firms’ return data on CRSP around the grant date, corresponding to 564 (393) applying firms in
654 (654) application firm-events. For each patent granted, the abnormal return for trading day t is
calculated as the daily return on the stock minus the value-weighted CRSP index on day t. Both returns
include dividends. Mean/median and differences values are reported as percentages. The differences in
means are tested by two independent samples t-test, and the differences in medians are tested by WilcoxonMann Whitney test. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one
percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.

Over the three trading days (-1, +1), firms with influential patents granted
experience a positively mean CARs of about 0.53%, which is statistically significant at
the five percent level, while the mean CARs in firms with non-influential patents granted
is not significant. Over the longer trading windows of days (-5, +5) and (-20, +5), firms
with influential patents granted experience positively larger mean CARs of about 1.33%
and 1.94%, both are statistically significant at the two percent level; firms with noninfluential patents granted also experience positive mean CARs of about 0.91% and
2.50%, both are statistically significant. The results show that the stock price reacts
positively to the news that an influential patent has been granted. The favorite market
reaction to an influential patent when it is granted additionally suggests that non-public
information does exist in firms with influential patents for a long period until the granting
of the patent.
The CARs of firms with influential patents are not significantly higher than those
of firms with non-influential patents at any reasonable statistical level. As stated, the
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matched control sample of “no-influential patent” firms is selected from the pool of firms
with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value of citation of its threedigit technology class in the application year, and a non-influential patent is randomly
chosen from patents with the lowest value of citations for each “no-influential” firmevent. This randomicity may have led to the insignificant differences between the CARs
of firms announcing the news of patents being granted.

Long-Run Stock Performance
Next, I compare the long-run stock performance of the sample of “influential
patent” firms and the matched control sample without any influential patent filed in the
sample period. The standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to
estimate the long-run abnormal returns for firms in each sample:
R , - R F , = a + frMKTRF, + J32HML, + 0 3SMBt + s , ,

(7)

where R, is the monthly stock return for a firm, RFt is the monthly risk-free rate, Rr RFt
is the excess return, MKTRF, is the excess return on the market, measured as the valueweighted market return minus the risk-free rate, HML, (High Minus Low) is the average
return on the two highest value (high book-to-market) portfolios minus the average return
on the two highest growth (low book-to-market) portfolios, and SMBt (Small Minus Big)
is the average return on the three smallest capitalization portfolios minus the average
return on the three biggest capitalization portfolios. The alpha (a) coefficient represents
the difference between the predicted monthly returns by the three factors and the actual
monthly returns, so alpha is viewed as the long-run abnormal return.
Table 14 reports the average long-run abnormal returns and the average return
differences between the sample of “influential patent” firms and the control sample in 36

months after the filing month (month 0). For the first year following the application
month (month one to 12), the abnormal returns of “influential patent” firms and “noinfluential patent” firms are not significantly different at 1.07% and 1.18%, respectively.
The control firms even have a significant and higher average abnormal return than
“influential patent” firms. However, when investors hold the stock for a longer time,
“influential patent” firms outperform the control firms. For two or three years following
the application month (month one to 24 or month one to 36), the mean abnormal returns
for “influential patent” firms are 1.79% and 1.64%. Both are significant at one percent
level and higher than those for the control firms, though the returns difference in the
months (1,24) is not significant.

Table 14

Long-Run Stock Performance
Mean long-run abnormal returns (%)
Month

N

(1) “Influential
patent” firms

(2) "Noinfluential patent”
firms

1.07

1.18***

Returns Difference (%)
(D -(2 )

t-stat

(1,12)

654

( 1 ,2 4 )

654

1.79***

1.49***

0.3

1.25

654

1.64***

1.31***

0.33

1.78*

( 1 ,3 6 )

-0.11

-0.14

This table reports the mean long-run abnormal returns and the average return difference between the
sample o f “influential patent” firms and the control sample o f “no-influential patent” firms in 36 months
after the filing month (month 0). The sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential
patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents
o f the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I
exclude the top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap,
if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those influential patents
whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential patent” firms is the
industry-year-size-performance matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists o f firms
with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its technology class in the
application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI,
and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I
identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary SIC code, an absolute
percentage difference o f market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference o f prioryear returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched
year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent” with filing dates, one patent with the lowest value
o f citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event.
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Table 14 (Continued)
All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Each sample consists o f 654
firm-events. The standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is used to estimate the long-run
abnormal returns for firms based on their monthly returns data on CRSP. Mean values and returns
differences are reported as percentages. The differences in means are tested by two independent samples ttest. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.

The evidence that “influential patent” firms have better long-run performance
than “no-influential patent” firms supports the long-term effect of influential
technological innovation on firms’ future development. This evidence, together with the
stock-price reaction evidence, supports my definition of influential patents in that those
technologies are influential and may signal future economic performance of firms.

ESO Exercise Data
ESO exercises data is obtained from the Thomson Financial Insiders Filings Data
Files (TFI, September, 2007). The data files capture all insider activities as reported on
Form Three, Four, Five and 144 filed with the SEC.7 Focusing on Form Four in the
Table Two of the TFI database, I consider two codes of option exercise transactions, M
(‘exercise of in-the money or at-the-money derivative security acquired pursuant to Rule
16b-3 plan’) and X (‘exercise of in-the-money or at-the-money derivative security’), for
each “influential patent” and control firm during the pre-application and post-application
periods. I drop filings marked as inaccurate or incomplete by TFI (Cleanse Indicators as
‘S’ or ‘A’), filings labeled as an amendment to an earlier filing (Amendment Indicator as
‘A ’), or transactions that involve shares indirectly owned by insiders via a partnership,

7 Most insider transactions are reported on Form Four. Form Three is the initial statement o f beneficial
ownership that insiders must file. Form Five reports annual changes in beneficial ownership and contains
activity from small or exempt transactions that are not reported on Form Four. Form 144 declares their
intention to sell restricted shares.
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corporation, trust or other entity (Ownership Type as ‘I’). Moreover, I require that the
security titles must include “option” except for “put option”, and that the underlying
security is common shares. The exercised stock options are reported both on the Table
One and Table Two files on TFI, but some numbers of underlying shares exercised are
not consistent. To reduce noise, I exclude those records with inconsistent numbers of
underlying shares exercised in two tables.
Next, I aggregate the transactions recorded on the same document with the same
exercise price, transaction date, vesting date, and expiration date by the same person,
since TFI reports multiple option exercises with the same exercise price on the same day
by a single manager as distinct transactions. These transactions are then analyzed as a
single exercise. I drop such exercise transactions involving less than ten shares, more
than 100% of firm’s shares outstanding, or where the exercise price is less than one cent
or more than 1,000 dollars. This action leaves 411,041 ESO exercises.
The option exercise transactions of all corporate insiders are examined. Following
prior studies, I utilize two measures to examine the level of option exercises: 1) the
number of underlying shares exercised and sold immediately by executives during a year
(#underlying-shares) and, 2) the in-the-money value of exercises during a year ($option).
The in-the-money value o f exercise is the difference between the stock and exercise
prices multiplied by the number of shares exercised. The later measure (in-the-money
value of exercise) is related more to the executives’ gains through early exercising and
has been commonly used in the literature related to option exercises.
As discussed above, options may be exercised for liquidity, diversification,
maturity, or other rational reasons. For the purpose of this study, it is crucial to divide
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option exercises as uninformed or informed and to focus only on those potentially
informed option exercises. Following Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2012), I identify
uninformed ESO exercises as those exercised within 30 days after the vesting date, within
30 days before the maturity date, within 30 days before the ex-dividend date, or those
underlying shares held in the executives’ portfolio following the exercise. Informed
exercises are defined as the complement of the above uninformed exercises. To increase
the sample size, I further treat those exercises with missing relative dates as informed. I
match option exercises in Table Two with open market sales in Table One to make sure
that all underlying shares were immediately sold upon exercise. In this way, 160,810
informed ESO exercises are identified over the period 1996 to 2007, where the
underlying shares were immediately sold. If a firm has no stock option exercised over the
informed or control periods, zero is assigned to the measures of option exercises. The
informed ESO exercises data is then merged with Compustat, CRSP, and patent data.

ESO Grants Data
ESO grants data is extracted from the TFI Filings Data Files as well. Focusing on
Form Four in the Table Two of TFI database, I consider transactions with code “A”
(grant or award) for each “influential patent” and control firm during the informed and
control periods. Similar with the process of data clean for option exercises, I drop filings
marked as inaccurate or incomplete by TFI, filings labeled as an amendment to an earlier
filing, or transactions that involve shares indirectly owned by insiders. I also require that
the security titles must include “option” except for “put option”, and that the underlying
security is common shares. I then aggregate the filings of grants that are awarded in a
given company on a given date. These transactions are analyzed as a grant event. This
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aggregation leaves 113,099 grant events by 11,321 distinct firms during the period 1996
to 2007. I use the total number of underlying shares granted in a given grant event
(#underlying-shares) to measure the level of option grants.
Most companies have schedules to grant options to top executives on roughly the
same dates o f every year. Since the scheduled grants are unlikely to be timed
opportunistically, the extant literature generally separates scheduled grants from other
grants. Following Lie (2005) and Heron and Lie (2007), I use a tightened definition to
categorize the scheduled grants that are excluded from further analysis. I identify an
option award as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day of the one-year
anniversary of the prior year’s award date. An unscheduled option grant is excluded if it
has unavailable or incomplete Compustat, CRSP, or patent data. This method yields a
final sample of 3,348 unscheduled grants from 4,434 option grant events over the period
1996 - 2007. If a firm did not award any option over the informed or control periods, I
assign zero to the measure of option grants.

Results of Informed Option Exercises
Following the method used in Agrawal and Nasser (2012), I compare the level of
informed option exercises in “influential patent” firms during the one-year pre
application period under two sets of controls: the time-series control and the crosssectional control. The time-series control examines informed option exercises in
“influential patent” firms over the informed and control periods. It perfectly controls for
firm characteristics, but does not control for possible changes in the exercise behavior of
executives over time. The cross-sectional control investigates informed option exercises
by executives of both “influential patent” and control firms over the same period. It
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emphasizes the opposite trade-off by controlling for the effect of the time period and
omitting firm attributes which may affect the level of option exercises. While each
control has its benefits and limitations, I focus on the dual-control, which equals the
abnormal exercises by executives in “influential patent” firms between the pre
application and control periods minus the abnormal exercises by executives in control
firms between the pre-application and control periods. Using this difference-indifferences (DID) approach, both the effects of firm characteristics and the time period
are controlled.

Univariate Results
Table 15 provides mean and median values of two measures of executives’ option
exercises for the sample o f “influential patents’ firms and control sample during the

informed and control periods. The informed period is the one-year period prior to a
patent’s filing date and control period is the one-year period after that. The two measures
of option exercises are: number of underlying shares exercised and sold immediately by
executives during a year (#underlying-shares) and in-the-money value of exercises during
a year (Soption). The in-the-money value of exercises is the difference between the stock
and exercise prices multiplied by the number o f shares exercised.
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Table 15
Univariate Test: Informed Option Exercises
All insiders
Non-influential
patents

p-values

(2)
Control
period

(3)
Informed
period

(4)
Control
period

0H 2)

30.14
825.44

51.14
1997.58

32.02
865.21

43.05
1000.35

0.000
0.004

0.737
0.816

0.055
0.468

0.200
0.019

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0.000
0.000

0.527
0.374

0.005
0.017

0.165
0.078

Statistic

Influential patents

ESO exercise
measures

0)
Informed
period

mean
#underlying-shares
Soption
median
#underlying-shares
Soption

d)-(3)

(3)-(4)

(1-2)(3-4)

This table reports the mean and median values o f two measures o f executives’ informed option exercises
for the sample o f “influential patent” firms and the control sample o f “no-influential patents’ firms during
the informed and control periods. The informed period is the one-year period before a patent’s filing date
and control period is the one-year period after that The sample of “influential patent” firms consist o f firms
with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent
most cited patents o f the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO
classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero.
To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential
patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance matched control sample.. The pool for the control
sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on
Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any influential patent in the sample period. For each
“influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit
primary SIC code, an absolute percentage difference o f market capitalization less than ten percent, and the
minimum difference o f prior-year returns in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for
multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample o f “no-influential patent”, one patent with the
lowest value o f citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on
the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Informed ESO exercises are identified as those exercised not within 30
days after the vesting date, not within 30 days before the maturity date, not within 30 days before the exdividend date, and those underlying shares not held in the executives’ portfolio following the exercise. The
two measures o f executives’ option exercises are: #underlying-shares (number o f underlying shares
exercised by executives in thousands during a year) and Soption (in-the-money value o f exercise in
thousands during a year). All insiders’ informed option exercise is from TFI Filings database. The
differences in means are tested by two-tailed matched-pair t-tests, and the differences in medians are tested
by Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. The p-values of differences are also reported.

Table 15 also reports p-values of the paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed ranks
tests for the mean and median differences in the measures of informed option exercises
between “influential patent” and “no-influential patent” firms. Column (l)-(2) (Column

(3)-(4)) shows p-values of test statistics for the change in the level of informed option
exercises for executives in “influential patent” firms (“no-influential patent” firms)
between the informed and control periods (i.e., the time-series control); Column (l)-(3)
shows p-values for the differences in the level of informed option exercises for
executives in the informed period between “influential patent” and “no-influential patent”
firms (i.e., the cross-sectional control); and Column (l-2)-(3-4) is for the differences
between (a) the changes in the level of informed ESO exercises in “influential patent”
firms between the informed and control periods and (b) the changes in the level of
informed ESO exercises in “no-influential patent” firms between the informed and
control periods (i.e., DID).
Based on the time-series control, Column (l)-(2) shows that executives in
“influential patent” firms exercise significantly fewer options and gain less in-the-money
value of exercises during the informed period than they do during the control period at
statistical one percent level; Column (3)-(4) indicates that the in-the-money value of
options exercised by executives in the control firms have no significant change during the
informed period and control period. The comparisons from cross-sectional control
(Column (l)-(3)) suggest no significant difference in the level of informed option
exercises between the two samples over the informed period. According to the DID
control, Column (l-2)-(3-4) implies that, the in-the-money value of exercises increases
from the pre-application period to the control period for both samples, but the increase in
“influential patent” firms is significantly larger than the change in control firms.
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Cross-Sectional Regressions
The results from univariate tests provide some preliminary evidence under the
time-series or DID controls; however, univariate tests do not control for other
determinants of the level of informed option exercises. Next, I estimate cross-sectional
regressions when controlling for other determinants of the normal level of informed
option exercises.
Regression Specification
To some extent, the insider behavior of exercising ESOs and selling the acquired
shares is similar with insiders’ open market sales; therefore, ESO exercises may be
influenced by the similar factors related to insider sales, including firm size, the level of
stock volatility, prior stock performance, stock liquidity, firm valuation, and innovation. I
attempt to control for these various factors in the cross-sectional regressions, for
“influential patent” and control firms. Two models are constructed to examine my
predictions. Equation (8) is for the time-series control for “influential patent” firms or
control firms only. For Equation (8), all explanatory variables for both the “influential
patent” firm and the matched control firm include two observations: One is for the oneyear pre-application (informed) period, and the other is for the control period. A binary
dummy variable labeled Pre-apply equals one if the exercise activity occurs during the
pre-application period and zero otherwise. Equation (9) is for the DID control for
“influential patent” firms and control firms together. For Equation (9), all explanatory
variables for each firm-event include four observations: Two observations for “influential
patents’ firm (for the pre-application and control periods) and two for the control firm
(for the pre-application and control periods). Influential-patent is a dummy variable equal
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to one if the firm has an influential patent filed and equal to zero otherwise. The main
explanatory variables are Pre-apply, Influential-patent, and Pre-apply* Influential-patent.
Coefficients o f the first two variables estimate the abnormal level of informed exercises
related to the time-series and cross-sectional controls, respectively. The coefficient of
interaction term estimates abnormal informed exercises under the DID control. The two
models and each measure of the control variables are described below:
ESO, =a0 + fi]Ln(Market_ Cap), +P2a, +P3PRETU+ PAB / M decile, + PSR & D / Salest
(°)
+ P6Liquidit)j + /?7 Pre_applyt + e,,i = 1,2,...
ESQ =

+ PfrfM arketCap, + /?2er +P3PRETh +PAB/M_decil?+P5R&D/Sale$

+P6Liquidity\-Pj Pre apply+PiInfluentia_patenfi-P) Preapply^ Influentia_patentr£,, (9)
1 = 1,2,...

Firm size (Ln(Market Cap)): Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders are likely to be net
sellers in large firms. Fu and Ligon (2010) provide evidence that executives in large firms
are more likely to exercise in-the-money ESOs within two days of the vesting date. I use
the natural logarithm of the market capitalization to control firm size. Market cap is
computed as the number of common shares outstanding times the share price as of the
ending last calendar year prior to the beginning of the informed or control period on
CRSP monthly dataset.
Stock volatility (a): Meulbroek (2000) finds that insiders in those more risky
companies tend to sell equity more actively. I measure the risk of a stock by the standard
deviation of stock returns of a firm over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning
of the informed or control period on CRSP daily data.
Prior stock performance (PRET.p : Lakonishok and Lee (2001) argue that insiders
tend to sell stocks when the past returns are high. Prior stock returns (PRET.i) are

computed as the buy-and-hold return for a firm over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the
beginning o f the informed or control period.
Firm valuation (B/M decile): Jenter (2005) finds that insiders are more likely to
sell a stock when the firm has a high valuation. Book-to-market (B/M) ratio is often used
to measure a firm’s valuation ratio relative to other firms. The B/M ratio is computed
from dividing the book value of equity divided by the market capitalization of common
shares outstanding as of the last calendar year ending prior to the informed or control
period. Based on NYSE B/M decile breakpoints in a given year, B/M decile is assigned
to one to ten depending on a firm’s B/M ratio.
Innovation (R&D/Sales): Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that information
asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors are more severe in R&Dintensive firms, and find that insider gains in firms conducting R&D are significantly
larger than those in firms with no R&D activities. R&D/Sales ratio is computed as R&D
expenses to sales revenue for the last fiscal year ending prior to the informed or control
period. I treat R&D expenses as zero if R&D expenses are missing on Compustat.
Stock liquidity: Prior studies (i.e., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985;
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) suggest that informed traders are more likely to trade when
stock liquidity is higher. Stock liquidity is calculated as the mean daily trading volume
divided by shares outstanding during one year prior to the informed or control period.
Pre-apply: A binary dummy variable equal to one if the executives’ exercise
activity occurs during the pre-application period and zero otherwise.
Influential-patent: A binary dummy variable equal to one if a firm has an
influential patent and zero otherwise.
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By controlling for those factors related to option exercises, I compare the
regressions’ results between “influential patent” and control firms. The dependent
variable (ESO) is one of the two measures of option exercises: number of underlying
shares exercised and sold immediately by executives during a year (#underlying-shares)
and in-the-money value of exercises during a year (Soption). Test statistics is calculated
using robust variances in each regression model.
Informed ESO Exercises
Informed ESO exercises are illustrated in Table 16. Using Equation (8), Panel
16.1 and 16.2 show the coefficient estimates and p-values of the regressions of two
measures o f executives’ option exercises in “influential patent” and control firms. Panel
16.3 presents the coefficient estimates and p-values from the regressions using Equation
(9). My main interest is in the coefficients of Pre-apply, Influential-patent, and Preapply^*Influential-patent. The sample of “influential patent” firms consists of 1,196
observations for which all the variables in the regressions have available data in CRSP
and Compustat, corresponding to 598 unique firm-events in which an influential patent
was filed. Similarly, the sample of “no-influential patent” firms consists of 1,293
observations, corresponding to 647 firm-events with a non-influential patent filed.
Consistent with prior studies in insider sales, Table 16 provides evidence that
executives exercise significantly more stock options when the firm is large, has a high
stock volatility, has a high prior stock return, has a high liquidity, or has a low B/M ratio.
In the sample of “influential patent” firms (Panel 16.1), all estimated coefficients of the
‘Pre-apply’ variable are significantly negative. In contrast, none of the estimated
coefficients of ‘Pre-apply’ is significantly different from zero for the control firms (Panel

16.2). Panel 16.3 provides consistent results using the DID control. The positive and
significant coefficients of variable “Influential-patent” imply that executives in
“influential patent” firms generally exercise more options and have higher in-the-money
value o f exercises than those in control firms. However, the significantly negative
coefficients of the interaction term, Pre-apply* Influential-patent, suggest that, the in-themoney value of exercises in “influential patent” firms is significantly lower during the
one-year pre-application period, relative to either the level during its control period or the
level in control firms.

Table 16
Regressions o f Informed Option Exercises
Table 16 Continued

Independent
Variables

Pre-apply

6.1 “Influential patent” firms

6.2 ”No-influential patent” firms

6.3 Difference in differences

Dependent variables

Dependent variables

Dependent variables
#underly
Soptions
ingshares
-134.01
-10.98
(0.116)
(0.516)

#underlyi
ng-shares
-19.25**
(0.014)

Soptions
-1123.05**
(0.018)

((underlying
-shares
-15.79**
(0.033)

Soptions
-1020.05**
(0.022)

#underlyi
ng-shares
-10.98
(0.116)

Soptions
-134.01
(0.517)

#underlyin
g-shares
-10.48
(0.119)

Soptions
-138.52
(0.470)

Influential-patent

Pre-apply
♦Influentialpatent

Ln(market cap)
0
PRET(-l)
B/M decile
R&D/Sales
Liquidity
Constant
N
Adjusted R2

1276

1990.96***
(0.000)
1276

0.004

0.004

50.94***
(0.000)

27.33***

1371.75***

(0.000)
865.60***
(0.001)
8.20*
(0.064)
-2.36**
(0.015)
0.00
(0.170)

(0.000)
54367.12**
(0.034)

-66.33
(0.129)

(0.000)
1196

-0.18
(0.235)
4318.22
(0.819)
-8507.09***
(0.002)
1196

0.129

0.082

632.02
(0.143)
-149.12***

43.00***
(0.000)
1308
0.001

-10.13
(0.133)

-116.81
(0.550)

7.94

991.75**

6.38

955.71**

(0.340)

(0.035)

(0.428)

(0.047)

-8.27

-989.04*

-5.69

-937.87*

(0.427)

(0.052)

(0.575)

(0.064)

533.42***

22.04***

947.13***

(0.000)

(0.000)
14654.84**
(0.013)
744.18***
(0.001)
-64.65***

(0.000)
746.43***
(0.000)
8.65**
(0.013)
-2.52***
(0.000)
-0.00
(0.949)
970.24**

(0.000)

(0.006)
-1.72

999.21***
(0.000)
1308

-84.99***
(0.000)
1293

(0.373)
54008.63***
(0.002)
-3166.61***
(0.000)
1293

0.000

0.095

0.145

-

Soptions

16.49***
555.42***
(0.002)
8.98*
(0.100)
-2.69***
(0.009)
-0.06
(0.125)
1767.37***
(0.003)

626.43**
(0.034)

#underlying
-shares

(0.011)

2584

2584

-121.15***
(0.000)
2489

0.003

0.004

0.111

35483.21***
(0.008)
696.39***
(0.000)
-66.18***
(0.006)
-0.20
(0.158)
20902.69
(0.146)
-6271.18***
(0.000)
2489
0.087

00

Table 16 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of two measures o f executives’ informed option exercises on several explanatory variables. The
sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent
most cited patents o f the application year in its three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited
patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance
matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any
influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary
SIC code, an absolute percentage difference o f market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference o f prior-year returns in the same year. A
firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample o f “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest
value o f citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Informed ESO exercises
are identified as those exercised not within 30 days after the vesting date, not within 30 days before the maturity date, not within 30 days before the ex-dividend
date, and those underlying shares not held in the executives’ portfolio following the exercise. Executives’ informed option exercises activities are measured
during two periods for each firm-event: One is the informed period, one-year before a patent’s filing date; the other is the control period, one-year period after a
firm applies for a patent. The dependable variables include #underlying-shares (number o f underlying shares exercised and sold by executives in thousands
during a year) and Soption (in-the-money value o f exercise in thousands during a year). All insiders’ option exercise data is from Thomson Insiders Filings
database. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share price as o f the last calendar year ending prior to the beginning o f
the informed or control period. The standard deviation o f stock returns (o) is calculated over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning o f the informed or
control period. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning o f the informed or control period. B/M decile
is assigned as one to ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value
of equity divided by market value o f equity ratio as o f the last calendar year ending prior to the informed or control period. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to
sales revenue for the last fiscal year ending prior to the informed or control period. Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share
outstanding during one year prior to the informed or control period. “Pre-apply” is a dummy variable equal to one if the executives’ informed option exercises
activity occurs during the informed period and equal to zero otherwise. “Influential-patent” is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an influential patent
filed and equal to zero otherwise. Test statistics are calculated using robust variance. The p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.

86
The distinct difference between the sample of “influential patent” and control
firms indicates that executives in the “influential patent” firms exercise significantly
fewer stock options over the pre-application period than over the post-application period.
This finding supports the view that executives delay their planned exercises to increase
their stock option compensation until after the filing of the influential patent, when the
firm’s stock price runs up.

Results of Unscheduled Option Grants
Using the similar method of analyzing the level of executives’ informed option
exercises, I compare the level of unscheduled option grants in “influential patent” firms
during the informed period under two sets of controls: the time-series control and the
cross-sectional control. I focus on the dual-control to control for both effects of firm
characteristics and time period. Following previous analysis, I first use the same way to
define the informed and control periods, but I do not find any abnormal pattern of
unscheduled option grants during the informed period (the results are not reported). I
examine unscheduled option grants over the one-year period before the grant date of an
influential patent (name the pre-grant period as the informed period). I do discover strong
evidence o f abnormal option grants around the date when an influential patent is granted
by the patent office.

Univariate Results
Table 17 provides mean and median values of the measure of executives’ option
grants for the sample of “influential patents’ firms and the control sample during the
informed and control periods. The format of Table 17 is similar to that of Table 15,

87
except that 1) the measures of informed option exercises are replaced by the measure of
unscheduled option grants and, 2) the informed period indicates the one-year period
before a patent’s grant date. I use the total number of underlying shares granted in a given
grant event (#underlying-shares) to measure the level of option grants.

Table 17
Univariate Test: Unscheduled Option Grants
Non-influential
patents

p-values

(2)
Control
period

(3)
Informed
period

(4)
Control
period

(l)-(2)

(l)-(3)

(3)-(4)

(1-2)(3-4)

374.45

307.89

284.17

334.84

0.093

0.036

0.225

0.036

75.04

114.33

78.17

75.37

0.553

0.927

0.465

0.728

Statistic

Influential patents

ESO grants
measures

(1)
Informed
period

mean
#underlying-shares
median
#underlying-shares

This table reports the mean values o f the measure of executives’ unscheduled option grants for “influential
patent” firms and “no-influential patents’ control firms during the informed and control periods. The
sample o f “influential patent” firms consist o f firms with influential patents filed during 1996-2006.
Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited patents of the application year in its
three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude those top ten percent
most cited patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple
influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those influential patents whose filing dates are
separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential patent” firms is the industry-year-sizeperformance matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists o f firms with patents whose
citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its technology class in the application years.
Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply
for any influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I identify a “noinfluential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary SIC code, an absolute percentage
difference o f market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference o f prior-year returns
in the same year. A firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched year. To
construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest value of citations is randomly
chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
The informed period is the one-year period before a patent’s grant date and control period is the one-year
period after that. An option award is categorized as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day o f the
one-year anniversary o f the prior year’s award date. The measure of executives’ unscheduled option grants
is: #underlying-shares (number of underlying shares granted to executives in thousands during a year). All
insiders’ option grants data is from TFI Filings database. The differences in means are tested by two-tailed
matched-pair t-test. The p-values of differences are reported in the table.
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Based on the time-series control (Column (l)-(2)), firms with influential patents
award significantly more options over the pre-grant period than over the post-grant
period. Oppositely, firms with non-influential patents award fewer options over the pre
grant period than over the post-grant period, though the difference is not significant.
Based on the cross-sectional control (Column (l)-(3)), firms with influential patents
award significantly more stock options than control firms during the same informed
period. According to the DID control, p-value 0.036 in Column (l-2)-(3-4) indicates that,
from the pre-grant period to the post-grant period, a) firms with influential patents
decrease the total number of stock options they award; b) the control firms increase the
amount o f stock options awarded; and 3) the difference between the changes in (a) and
(b) significantly differ from zero at five percent level.
Table 17 provides evidence that firms award more options to their executives before
the grant of influential patents and fewer after that. This finding is consistent with the
point that executives may time an option grant to occur before an anticipated stock price
appreciation. The significant difference in the dual control may be explained as top
executives are able to forecast the approximate date of granting an influential patent, and
executives then time option grants to occur with the expectation that the stock price will
increase after the news of granting is announced.

Cross-Sectional Regressions
The probability of option grants is also significantly influenced by some of the
firm characteristics. Smith and Watts (1992) find that large firms and growth firms are
significantly more likely to use option grants as part of their incentive contracts.
Therefore, I control for the lagged value of the firm’s market capitalization

{Ln(MarketCap)) and book to market ration {B/Mdecile). According to prior studies
(Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kaszznik, 2000; Lie, 2005), previous stock return (PRET.j)
is included to control for managerial manipulation of grants’ issue-dates around local
minimum returns. Since Yermack (1995) finds that liquidity-constrained firms appear to
provide a great fraction of CEO compensation from stock options, I further control for
stock liquidity in the regressions. Following Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011), who find
positive relation between the prior year return volatility and probability of granting
unscheduled options, I use the standard deviation of prior stock returns to control for the
risk of a stock {volatility o). Finally, innovation is controlled for using the measure of
R&D/Sales ratio since Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that R&D activities create unique
information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside investors. All variables
are computed in the same way as examining ESO exercises. The two models used in this
section are:
Award, = a0 + f5xLr{Market_Cap), + /?2or + j33PRETh +fi4B/M _decilq +/3SR& D ! Sales,

^j ^

+ (3bL iquidity+ ?re_grant, +s„i = 1,2,...

A w a r +/?, LriMarketCafi, +(32a, +/32PRETh +/34Bl M_decil?+f3sR&D/ Sale?
+/3bLiquidity¥/31Pre_granf+f3iInfluentia_patenfi-fa Pre_granfInfluentia_patenfi-£„ (11)

/ = 1,2, Equation (10) is used for the time-series control for “influential patent” firms or
control firms only. The binary dummy variable Pre-grant equals one if an award occurs
during the pre-grant period and zero otherwise. Equation (11) is used for the DID control
for “influential patent” firms and control firms together. Influential-patent is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm has an influential patent filed and equal to zero
otherwise. The main explanatory variables are Pre-grant, Influential-patent, and Pre
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grant* Influential-patent. The dependent variable (Award) is the number of underlying
shares granted to executives in a firm during a year (#underlying-shares). I control for
industry and year fixed effects and calculate test statistics using robust variances in each
regression model.
Table 18 examines unscheduled option grants in firms around the grant date of a
patent. The format of Table 18 is similar to that of Table 16, except that the measures of
informed option exercises are replaced by the measure of unscheduled option grants.
Using Equation (10), Panel 18.1 and 18.2 show the coefficient estimates and p-values of
the regressions of the measure of option grants in “influential patent” firms and control
firms. Panel 18.3 displays the coefficient estimates and p-values from the regressions
using Equation (11).
The results in Table 18 show a firm is more likely to grant stock options when it
is larger, has a higher stock volatility, or has a lower liquidity. In the sample of
“influential patent” firms (Panel 18.1), the estimated coefficient of the ‘Pre-grant’
variable is significantly positive. In contrast, the estimated coefficient o f ‘Pre-grant’ is
insignificantly negative for the matched control firms (Panel 18.2).
Panel 18.3 provides consistent results using the DID control. The negative
coefficient of variable “Pre-grant” indicates that firms generally award fewer options
during the pre-grant period than the post-grant period. However, the significantly positive
coefficient of the interaction term, Pre-grant* Influential-patent, implies that, firms with
influential patents award significantly more stock options during the pre-grant period,
relative to the level during the post-grant period.

The distinct difference between the sample of “influential patent” and control
firms indicates that firms grant significantly more stock options over the one-year pre
grant period than over the post-grant period when they expect an influential patent being
granted. This finding discovers that firms award more unscheduled stock options before
the grant news o f an influential patent to maximize executives’ stock option
compensation, given the expectation of the appreciation of stock price afterward.

Table 18
Regressions o f Unscheduled Option Grants

Independent Variables

8.1 “Influential patent” firms

8.2 ”No-influential patent” firms

8.3 Difference in differences

Dependent variables

Dependent variables

Dependent variables

#underlyingshares
Pre-grant

#underlyingshares

67.48
(0.159)

#underlyingshares

88.61*
(0.065)

#underlyingshares

-51.66
(0.305)

#underlyingshares

-17.19
(0.700)

Influential-patent
Pre-grant ’"Influential-patent
119.04***
(0.000)
9451.21***
(0.000)
7.71
(0.796)
11.47
(0.250)
-0.07**
(0.050)
-2673.82*
(0.057)
Yes
Yes

Ln(market cap)
o
PRET(-l)
B/M decile
R&D/Sales
Liquidity

#underlyingshares

-51.66
(0.305)
-28.85
(0.589)
119.13*
(0.087)

-17.69
(0.706)
-74.13
(0.126)
111.86*
(0.096)
123.64***
(0.000)
8809.41***
(0.000)
-7.35
(0.723)
16.47
(0.122)
-0.00
(0.981)
-2116.34*
(0.078)
Yes
Yes

138.17***
(0.000)
8140.10***
(0.000)
-30.83
(0.100)
29.03
(0.191)
1.24***
(0.000)
-1922.04
(0.592)
Yes
Yes

Industry FE
Year FE
N

1306

1288

1306

1289

2612

2577

Adjusted R2

0.001

0.105

0.000

0.044

0.000

0.075

Table 18 (Continued)
This table reports the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of the measure o f executives’ unscheduled option grants on several explanatory variables. The
sample o f “influential patent” firms consists o f firms with influential patents filed during 1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent
most cited patents o f the application year in its 3-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification. I exclude those top ten percent most cited
patents with total adjusted citations equal to zero. To avoid overlap, if a firm has multiple influential patents during the sample period, I only examine those
influential patents whose filing dates are separated by at least two years. The sample o f “no-influential patent” firms is the industry-year-size-performance
matched control sample. The pool for the control sample consists of firms with patents whose citations are ranked below the median value o f citation o f its
technology class in the application years. Firms in the pool are required to have corresponding data on Compustat, CRSP, and TFI, and did not apply for any
influential patent in the sample period. For each “influential patent” firm, I identify a “no-influential patent” firm in the pool with the same two-digit primary
SIC code, an absolute percentage difference o f market capitalization less than ten percent, and the minimum difference o f prior-year returns in the same year. A
firm in the matched sample may apply for multiple patents in the matched year. To construct the sample of “no-influential patent”, one patent with the lowest
value o f citations is randomly chosen for each firm-event. All firms in the two samples are listed on the NYEX, AMEX, or NASDAQ. An option award is
categorized as unscheduled if it does not occur within one day o f the one-year anniversary o f the prior year’s award date. Firms’ unscheduled option awards are
measured during two periods for each firm-event: One is the informed period, one-year before a patent’s grant date; the other is the control period, one-year
period after a patent is granted. The dependable variable is #underlying-shares (number o f underlying shares granted to executives in thousands during a year).
All insiders’ option grants data is from Thomson Insiders Filings database. Market cap is computed as the number o f common shares outstanding times the share
price as of the last calendar year ending prior to the beginning o f the informed or control period. The standard deviation o f stock returns (a) is calculated over
trading days (-1, -365) relative to the beginning o f the informed or control period. PRET (-1) is the buy-and-hold return for a firm over trading days (-1, -365)
relative to the beginning o f the informed or control period. B/M decile is assigned as one to ten depending on the firm’s B/M ratio. I use NYSE B/M decile
breakpoints to assign a firm’s B/M decile. B/M is calculated as book value of equity divided by market value o f equity ratio as o f the last calendar year ending
prior to the informed or control period. R&D/Sales ratio is R&D expense to sales revenue for the last fiscal year ending prior to the informed or control period.
Liquidity equals to the mean daily trading volume divided by share outstanding during one year prior to the informed or control period. “Pre-grant” is a dummy
variable equal to one if the executives’ unscheduled option grants occurs during the informed period and equal to zero otherwise. “Influential-patent” is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm has an influential patent filed and equal to zero otherwise. Test statistics are calculated using robust variance. The p-values are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the one percent, five percent, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Summary and Conclusions
This study empirically examines whether the exercising and awarding of
executive stock options are relevant to superior information about the quality of a firm’s
patents, especially for informed option exercises and unscheduled option grants. Focusing
on 654 firm-events with an influential patent filed, I analyze executives’ option-related
behavior around the filing or granting date of an influential patent during the period
1996-2006. Influential patents are identified as those top ten percent most cited of the
application year for the three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO
classification. To compare executives’ abnormal option transaction behavior and assess
abnormal performance, I construct a matched sample according to industry, year, size,
and prior firm performance.
In difference-in-differences regressions of two measures of option exercises, I
find that executives significantly delay exercising their stock options by reducing option
exercises in the year before application of an influential patent and increasing option
exercises after that. I find no such pattern of informed option exercises in the matched
control sample.
I further document that firms award significantly more unscheduled stock options
to their executives over the year before an influential patent is granted than over the year
after that, but the control firms award fewer unscheduled stock options before a noninfluential patent is granted than after that.
My findings support the hypothesis that managers have a strong informational
advantage in discriminating the quality of patents during the whole process of patent
activity, from before the application to the grant of a patent. In addition to exercising

options opportunistically, influencing the timing of unscheduled option grants is another
channel through which insiders can pursue personal gains by exploiting this
informational advantage.

CHAPTER THREE

CONCLUSIONS

It has been broadly documented that insiders exploit information advantages to
earn abnormal returns from trading in the securities of their firms prior to major corporate
events. This study extensively investigates whether insiders pursue personal interests by
using private information about the quality of the firm’s innovation output, represented
by the application and grant of an influential patent. Chapter One focuses on insiders’
open market trading before the filing year of an influential patent, while Chapter Two
concentrates on informed executive stock option (ESO) exercises and unscheduled option
awards before the filing or grant date of an influential patent. In both chapters, influential
patents are identified as those top ten-percent most cited of the application year for the
three-digit technology sub-category based on the USPTO classification.
In Chapter One, I first document that the market reacts more favorably when an
influential patent is granted than when an inconsequential patent is granted. I then present
that post-application long-run abnormal returns for the sample firms with influential
patents are significantly higher than two control samples. Next, I investigate purchases,
sales, and net purchases of three groups of insiders, using three measures of the level of
insider trading and controlling for factors related to insider trading.
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I find that insiders in “influential patent” firms reduce their purchases in the pre
application year, though not significantly, relative to their trading level during the
application year. Nevertheless, their net purchases are significantly higher for the same
period due to the significantly larger reductions in their sales. This pattern of passive
trading holds true for each insider group and for each of three measures of insider trading.
I find no such significantly consistent pattern in two control samples.
In Chapter Two, I examine executives’ informed stock option exercises and
unscheduled option grants before the filing or grant date of an influential patent. To
compare executives’ abnormal option transaction behavior and assess abnormal
performance, I construct a matched sample according to industry, year, size, and prior
firm performance. Informed ESO exercises are identified as those exercised not within 30
days after the vesting date, not within 30 days before the maturity date, not within 30
days before the ex-dividend date, and those underlying shares not held in the executives’
portfolio following the exercise. I categorize an option award as unscheduled if it does
not occur within one day of the one-year anniversary of the prior year’s award date.
In difference-in-differences regressions of two measures of option exercises, I
find that executives significantly delay exercising their stock options by reducing option
exercises in the year prior to the application of an influential patent and increasing option
exercises after that. I find no such pattern of informed option exercises in the matched
control sample.
I further document that firms award significantly more unscheduled stock options
to their executives in the year before the grant of an influential patent than in the year
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after that. However, the control firms award fewer unscheduled stock options before a
non-influential patent is granted than after that.
My findings support the hypothesis that managers have a strong informational
advantage in discriminating the quality of a patent during the lengthy process of patent
activity, from preparing application to granting of a patent. In addition to insiders’ open
market trading, exercising ESOs opportunistically and influencing the timing of
unscheduled option grants are other important channels through which insiders can
pursue personal interests by exploiting this informational advantage.
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